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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Notions of character are central to both normative and applied ethics. Over the past 15 
years or so, a growing number of philosophers have advanced empirically-based critiques of 
virtue ethics, arguing for skepticism about character. I show how standard approaches to virtue 
ethics can be modified so as to avoid these rather damaging empirical critiques. The most 
promising responses to character skepticism, however, are not always available to virtue ethical 
approaches to applied ethics. In particular, I argue that virtue ethical approaches to business 
ethics are in need of novel responses to character skepticism or radical revision.  
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PREFACE 
 
 
 
 
The outline for this project is as follows. In chapter 1 I provide a general overview of the 
contemporary virtue ethics tradition, along with its connection to Aristotle’s original work on 
virtue. Additionally, I highlight two major commitments of virtue ethics. First, that the actual 
possession of particular traits and virtues is essential for right action in numerous virtue ethical 
accounts. Second, that virtue ethics is aimed at the actual development of virtue as part of its 
commitment to human flourishing. 
In chapter 2, I identify the general situationist argument against virtue ethics, and argue 
for its key premises. I go on to identify the key empirical commitments of virtue ethics most 
relevant for the so-called character debate. Generally speaking, virtue ethics is committed to 
some form of psychological realism and the causal power of traits of character to produce trait-
relevant behavior. To broaden the scope of the situationist argument, I identify a range of 
behaviors that could count as trait-relevant behavior for the virtue ethicist. These include 
perception, construal, deliberation, overt behavior, and emotional responses. 
Chapter 3 contains a representative sample of the empirical data cited by situationists. For 
my own contribution to this part of the debate, I divide the results of the empirical data based on 
which of the aforementioned trait-relevant behaviors the data shows as having problematic 
behavioral inconsistency. As a result, I argue that the defender of virtue ethics cannot avoid 
situationist criticism by attempting to re-locate the behavior most important for trait possession. 
In chapter 4 I address recent responses by defenders of virtue ethics that the situationist 
understanding of consistency is overly focused on objective features of a situation, and ignores 
the more important psychological features. I argue that recent attempts to redefine consistency 
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fail. The failure is due to the proposed accounts of consistency being either normatively 
inadequate or empirically inadequate.  
I consider, in chapter 5, promising new approaches to virtue ethics that I believe avoid 
situationist arguments. Despite avoiding issues of behavioral inconsistency, I still highlight some 
potential obstacles for these so-called instrumentalist approaches. Additionally, I transition the 
discussion to character-based approaches in applied ethics. 
Finally, in chapter 6, I consider the virtue ethical approach most popular by business 
ethicists. The approach focuses, in part, on the development of particular traits of character. I 
argue that the problems posed by situationists are more acute for character-based approaches to 
business ethics than they are to more general theories of virtue ethics. This is due to the 
particular practical demands on a normative theory of business ethics, which preclude the 
standard defenses of virtue ethical theories against situationist criticism. Accordingly, character-
based business ethics is in need of novel responses to situationism or radical revision. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
VIRTUE ETHICS 
 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The contemporary tradition of virtue ethics, often drawing inspiration from Aristotle, has 
steadily gathered steam since Anscombe’s (1958) rallying call for new directions in moral 
theorizing. Virtue ethics is sometimes described as of the three major branches of normative 
ethics, in company with consequentialism and deontology. Generally speaking, what sets virtue 
ethics apart from other approaches to normative ethics is a focus on the character of the moral 
agent, rather than consequences of particular actions or adherence to principles and duties. It 
should be noted, however, that talk of moral character is certainly not absent from the other 
branches of normative ethics.
1
  
Most versions of virtue ethics discussed in contemporary philosophy follow a broadly 
Aristotelian tradition, with a focus on virtue (arete), practical wisdom (phronesis), and 
flourishing (eudaimonia).
2
 Much of the discussion throughout this dissertation focuses on this 
generally Aristotelian approach to virtue ethics.
3
 To put the view succinctly, doing the right thing 
consists in acting from a virtuous character. Acting from a virtuous character consists in the act 
being intentional in the right kind of way, for the right kinds of reasons, and with the right kind 
of attitude and feelings towards those actions (Adams 2006: 218, Kamtekar 2004: 479-481, 
Hursthouse 1999: 123-125). In this chapter, I discuss the major commitments of virtue ethics as 
understood by its prominent supporters and detractors. In this way, what makes virtue ethics 
                                                          
1
 For example, Kant develops a view of character in the Doctrine of Virtue. 
2
 See Annas (2011) and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue). 
3
 For the reminder of the dissertation, discussion of virtue ethics will refer to a broadly Aristotelian framework. 
What is entailed by this specific framework is discussed in chapter 2. 
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distinctive as a normative enterprise, in particular its focus on the development of particular traits 
of character and personal flourishing, is made clear. 
In Section II, I discuss conceptions of character and virtue found throughout the virtue 
ethics tradition, in particular the understanding of virtue as an ‘excellence’ of character. Section 
III details the relationship between virtue and right action, along with some attempts in the 
literature to specifically define right action for virtue ethics. In Section IV I go on to identify 
some of the specific qualities of the virtues, and what expectations we should have of someone 
with possession of said virtues. Section V identifies the pre-virtuous states most people will be in 
throughout their lives, and in Section VI I discuss the importance of virtue development to virtue 
ethics.  Finally, in Section VII, I provide some concluding thoughts that will help frame the 
discussion in the next chapter regarding recent empirically-based critiques of virtue ethics. 
II. Virtue & Character (Excellence) 
 
Virtue is often described as an enduring disposition and quality of an agent that, as is so 
often quoted, “goes all the way down”.4 As defenders of virtue ethics take pains to point out, 
especially in light of recent empirical criticism of virtue ethics, virtue and character are much 
more than mere overt behavioral dispositions. For example, a generous person is not merely 
someone who performs generous acts in appropriate circumstances. If this were true, the genuine 
philanthropists and the corporate CEO looking to decrease their tax liability via charitable 
donations would both be correctly described as generous. The truly generous individual is 
generous because of what she values, what she believes, what she’s sensitive to, and not only 
because of what she does. Character can be contrasted with something like a habit or a 
personality trait, such as being a vegetarian or laconic.  
                                                          
4
 E.g., Annas (2010:9) and Hursthouse (1999:11). 
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The virtuous agent is said to possess an excellent state of character. For Aristotle, this is a 
particular state or condition (hexis) that disposes the possessor to respond in appropriate ways 
(EN 1105b25-6). Aristotle goes on to describe virtue as an intermediate between two extremes 
(EN 1106a26-b28). For example, the virtue of Courage is a state between cowardice and 
brashness. Importantly, the state of virtue is not necessarily in the exact middle of two extremes, 
but is instead the appropriate condition between two problematics ones. The demands of a 
particular situation will help specify the appropriateness of certain responses. Expressing virtue 
can take many forms. Courage, for example, may be rushing to the defense a friend in one case, 
and remaining hidden while a friend suffers in the other (EN 1106a36-b7). Aristotle is, of course, 
only the starting point for many in the tradition, and contemporary discussions of character and 
virtue have gone off in many different directions. Consistent with her more pluralist project, 
Christine Swanton (2001:38) provides a nice general conception of virtue:  “A virtue is a good 
quality or excellence of character. It is a disposition of acknowledging or responding to items in 
the field of a virtue in an excellent (or good enough) way.” For Swanton the “field of a virtue” is 
meant to encompass the relevant areas where the virtue would be applicable. Swanton intends 
this to be a very general, structural model of virtue ethics that gets filled out by particular 
theories.   
While Aristotle describes the development of virtue as partially a matter of habituation, it 
is important not to think of character and virtue, in the sense used in virtue ethics, as merely 
regularity of overt behavior. The exercise of virtue is not an unthinking, mechanical response, 
though it might include behaviors below the level of conscious thought. On one account, for the 
virtuous, temptations or considerations of vice are “silenced” in the virtuous individual.5 The 
                                                          
5
 McDowell (1978). 
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development of virtue is not a solitary pursuit, as it is sometimes described as needing the 
appropriate social circle or even a virtuous exemplar. 
One account of virtue describes virtue development as analogous to the learning and 
continued practice of a particular skill. Annas (2011) argues for such a view, where acquiring 
virtue involves, roughly, an instructor and student-type relation. The student starts on the path of 
virtue by following the direct commands or suggestions of the instructor. Hursthouse describes 
such early parts of virtue development as rules we learn at “mother’s knee”.6 For example, we 
begin to learn about the virtue of generosity when we are told to share our toys or candy with 
others. Learning virtue always starts in what Annas labels as an embedded context. We do not 
learn how to be generous by reflecting on abstract principles, but by first being directed how to 
act generously in specific contexts.
7
 As the number of contexts we learn about increases, the 
hope is that we will start to see commonalities as to what it is generosity demands. Like with any 
skill, such a model of virtue and action requires a drive to aspire on the part of the agent, so 
Annas’ model here should not be seen as a passive acquirement of virtue over time. Nor should it 
be understood as simple mimicry of one’s virtue exemplar. Just as the piano student cannot 
simply imitate their teacher’s movements to become a skilled piano player, the student of virtue 
must work to become sensitive to the demands that guide their teacher’s actions. 
The skill analogy, while not held by all proponents of virtue ethics, brings out an 
important distinction made by Aristotle that is common throughout much of the virtue ethics 
literature. Virtuous action born from mere habit or thoughtless instinct is termed natural virtue, to 
be contrasted with proper virtue. Natural virtue appears to do the work of virtue, resulting in 
seemingly virtuous actions, but it is unreflective or simply the product of rote memorization. 
                                                          
6
 Hursthouse (1999:38). 
7
 Annas, (2011: 22) 
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While we might praise the child for sharing with his friends, to ascribe the full virtue of 
generosity to the child is inaccurate.   
While the above accounts differe somewhat in approach, a common theme throughout is 
the importance of the development of a virtuous character. Just as acquiring a particular skill or 
habit effects change in the individual, virtue ethics is meant to change individuals in certain 
ways. For Aristotle, the development of virtue contributes to the end or purpose (telos) of human 
life. Given the unique human capacity for rational thought, Aristotle thought we should strive to 
develop that rationality as much as possible.
8
 An important part of a virtuous character is the 
ability to discern and execute the best course of action, given the particulars of the situation. 
Aristotle’s understanding of the human telos directly informs his conclusion that contemplation 
is the highest human good.
9
 From the classical account by Aristotle to more contemporary skill-
based accounts, the actual instantiation of virtuous states of character is an important aim of 
virtue ethical accounts. The developmental goal of virtue ethics plays an important role 
throughout the remainder of this dissertation.
10
  
III. Virtue & Action 
Hursthouse (1999:31) helpfully summarizes an account of right action for virtue ethics: 
“An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would, characteristically, do in the 
circumstances.” 11 At first glance, this appears uninformative, since if I am unware of how the 
virtuous agent would act, such a summary appears unhelpful. Indeed, it appears to put virtue 
ethics at a significant disadvantage when compared to its normative competitors. Hursthouse 
                                                          
8
 See Aristotle Book II, Chapter 3 of the Physics and Book I, Chapter 3 of the Metaphysics. 
9
 Aristotle Book X, Chapter 7 of the Ethics. 
10
 I discuss virtue development in more detail in Section VI. 
11
 There are variations throughout the virtue ethics literature as to what constitutes right action, but connection to the 
character of the virtuous agent remains. For other account see, for example, Tiberius (2006), Russell (2009) and 
Liezl van Zyl (2011). I just wish to identify that there is a connection between actual virtue possession and right 
action; the intricacies of the connection between virtue and right action may be set aside. 
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goes on to argue, however, that consequentialism and deontology can appear to have similar, 
uninformative accounts of right action: 
 
Consequentialism: An action is right iff that action produces the best kind of consequences. 
Deontology: An action is right iff the action is consistent with the ethical principles.  
 
In each case, an important ethical concept remains undescribed. What are the best kinds of 
consequences? What are the right ethical principles? In being left in the dark as to what the 
virtuous agent is like, we are at least no worse off than consequentialism or deontology, at least 
according to Hursthouse. In each case, the given moral theory needs to fill out important features 
of the respective normative enterprise. For the virtue ethicist, the question turns to not only what 
the virtuous agent does in the circumstances, but also how they perform those actions in a 
characteristically virtuous way.
12
 Here we begin to see some of the early commitments of virtue 
ethics with respect to right action. While the right action is to be judged by considering what the 
virtuous agent would do, judgments as to whether or not someone is performing a right act 
requires a particular state of character of the agent in question during the performance of that 
action. Two agents might perform the same bodily movements, and even act for similar reasons, 
but if an agent fails to act from the right kind of character and in the right kind of way, that agent 
fails to act rightly. This understanding of virtue has its roots in Aristotle where virtue is said to 
require the use of reason in the form of practical wisdom, not just simple consistency with 
virtuous action (EN VI.13 1145a). For virtue ethics, the actual instantiation of a particular state 
of character in agents is essential to right action. 
                                                          
12
 For example, see Kamtekar (2004). 
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Importantly, failure to perform as the virtuous agent would do does not imply that the 
agent is a bad or vicious person.  For instance, children can perform the same bodily movements 
associated with virtuous action, yet fail to act from a virtuous character. Such acts would hardly 
be called wrong. For many virtue ethical accounts, possessing virtue is a matter of degree, rather 
than a binary quality (e.g., Annas 2011:89-91). Additionally, some proponents of virtue ethics, 
including Hursthouse in later work, have sought to expand and refine the definition of right 
action. An immediate difficulty, or at least a bit of strangeness, to Hursthouse’s original 
definition of right action are the everyday things a virtuous agent would characteristically do that 
don’t seem to square with what we could consider “right action”. For example, the virtuous agent 
would characteristically brush their teeth twice a day or stretch before a strenuous workout. 
Given there is no gradation of rightness in the original definition, some everyday tasks seem to 
be on the same level as laudable acts of courage or compassion.
13
 Hursthouse sought to address 
this issue by providing a definition of supererogatory acts as those which the virtuous agent 
would characteristically do, but are nevertheless still quite difficult to do.
14
 In introducing 
different classes of right actions, some conception of a gradation of right action might be 
possible. Whatever the success of this proposal or others might be, the connection of virtue and 
right action remains throughout the virtue ethical tradition.  
Many proponents of virtue ethics argue that the correct conception of right action is that 
such acts are the product of a particular kind of deliberative process. Virtue provides the ability 
to respond to the appropriate reasons for action in order to pursue good ends; but possessing 
virtue, by itself, does not determine what we do. The conception of virtue as responsiveness to 
reasons needs to be contrasted with an automatic series of predictable reactions to the appropriate 
                                                          
13
 Russell (2009:112-130) and  van Zyl  (2014:124-125). 
14
 Hursthouse (2006:11). 
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conditions.
15
  In contrast to a habit or automatic response, virtue is best described as guiding us 
to act and think in particular ways. Describing acting from virtue with respect to our friends, 
Swanton (2001:40) notes, “A good friend does not merely promote the good of her friend: she 
appreciates her friend, respects, and even loves her friend. Caring as a virtue involves receptivity, 
perhaps love in some sense, and to a large extent promotion of good.” Virtue is a complex 
behavioral disposition, often referred to as a “thick” moral concept, as it encompasses 
descriptive, evaluative, and even emotional components.
16
  
The thickness of virtue concepts, with the wide variety of rational and emotional 
processes involved with virtuous action, makes Hursthouse’s definition of right action a bit 
difficult to put into practice. If I’m someone interested in doing the right thing in a particular 
situation, and I happen to be in a non-virtuous state, it may be very difficult for me to discern 
what the virtuous individual would, characteristically, do in the circumstances. Indeed, 
depending on the situation, it may be one that a virtuous individual would never have gotten 
herself into in the first place, so it’s even harder to imagine what they might do.  
Hursthouse resists the move to codify a decision procedure for virtue ethics based purely 
on what it is the virtuous individual would do in the circumstances.
17
 Hursthouse maintains that 
one needs to exercise virtuous faculties in order to actually do as the virtuous person would. She 
claims it is a mistake to say something like “The virtuous agent never does what is wrong” since 
this presupposes a prior identification of wrong action.
18
 Without the character or virtue of the 
virtuous agent, one might not be able to act as the virtuous agent would in the circumstances. 
                                                          
15
 Kamtekar (2004).  
16
 See Williams (1985:140-142;150-152)  and Foot (2001;2002). The reading of “behavioral” here should be 
exceptionally broad. I go into more detail as to how broad in Chapter 2. 
17
 Hursthouse (1999:39-42, 56-58). 
18
 Hursthouse (1999:73). 
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The actions must stem from a settled state of character, not merely mimicking what the virtuous 
agent might do.  
As a would-be “competitor” to the traditions of consequentialist and deontology, virtue 
ethics has been specifically criticized for the kind of anti-codifiability Hursthouse argues for. 
After all, action guidance is a common desideratum for a normative theory. The need for 
codifiability is not an uncontroversial claim though. During much of its contemporary 
development, proponents of virtue ethics have objected to the notion that “proper” ethical 
theories have clearly defined rules and decision procedures.
19
 Aristotle himself resists the idea of 
a comprehensive rule set, likening the exercise of ethics to that of something like medicine (EN 
1104a7-10). Doctors do not simply exclusively follow a flow chart when treating patients, as 
they must exercise skilled judgment in each case, appreciating the complexity of each patient. 
Hursthouse, while maintaining that right action must come from a virtuous character, comments 
that it is not as though right action is always a complete mystery to the non-virtuous. It’s 
commonly accepted that the honest person, for example, is quick to correct false impressions, 
and makes sure a potential partner in a contract is aware of and understands what they are 
agreeing to.
20
 For a particular class of moral cases, what the virtuous person would 
characteristically do is not difficult to guess. As a result, Hursthouse claims virtue ethics has 
sufficient condificaition for the clear and more unproblematic cases. She goes on to say, 
however, action guidance breaks down quickly as cases get more complex, as in how honest one 
should be in various circumstances, or exactly when it might be better to break a long held 
                                                          
19
 E.g., McDowell (1979:336). 
20
 Hursthouse (1999:11). 
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promise. In these hard cases, codification becomes unreasonable. In the challenging cases, one 
needs judgment and moral wisdom of the virtuous agent in order to act rightly.
21
  
Hursthouse terms the most difficult cases as “tragic dilemmas”. In a tragic dilemma, none 
of the options open to an agent seem to fit with what we might normally think of as what the 
virtuous agent would do. An example of a tragic dilemma is a “Sophie’s Choice” situation where 
a parent must choose the life of one of their two children over the other. As Hursthouse puts is, it 
is a situation where a virtuous agent “cannot emerge with her life unmarred.”22 Tragic dilemmas 
are sometimes seen as a particular problem for virtue ethics. If either option in the dilemma 
seems seriously problematic, if one of the options is what the virtuous individual would 
(characteristically) do in the circumstances, then it should, in fact, be the right thing to do. One 
alternative is to say something like the virtuous person would never find themselves in a tragic 
dilemma in the first place. But this is hardly satisfying. After all, the most difficult and trying 
circumstances are where one might wish to rely on a moral theory the most. In tragic dilemmas, 
a virtue ethical approach seems to be worse off than a consequentialist or deontological 
alternative. The consequentialist can be guided by selection of the best among a bad lot of 
options. While right action for the consequentialist may be difficult to carry out, one can at least 
appreciate some clarity in why one choice is to be preferred over another.  For the deontologist, 
there may be some weighing of principles or obligations, but there is some guidance about what 
the relevant considerations actually are. And for some deontologists, they may even take a 
Kantian line where there are no real tragic dilemmas, as there will always be one option or 
another where one has a stronger grounds of obligation.
23
 The problems in tragic dilemmas 
appear more acute for the virtue ethicist. While not in principle a structural problem, 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., 59-62. 
22
 Ibid., 79. 
23
 Kant (2012/1785). 
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characterizing what seems like an awful action as a right action might cost virtue ethics some of 
its intuitive appeal. 
Hursthouse’s proposed solution to tragic dilemmas does much to clarify the virtue ethical 
account of right action, and this solution has had an important influence on the continued 
development of virtue ethics. Hursthouse presents the following fuller account of what 
constitutes right action for a virtue ethicist.
24
 
An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would, characteristically, do in the 
circumstances, except for tragic dilemmas, in which a decision is right iff it is what such 
an  agent would decide, but the action decided upon may be too terrible to be called 
‘right’ or ‘good’. 
 
Of note in the above definition is the shift from talk from “right action” to “right decision”. In a 
tragic dilemma, even the virtuous agent, acting from virtue, does not perform a right action, even 
if it is the right decision. Here, Hursthouse is rejects what she describes as the “primacy of 
character”. To maintain the primacy of character is to hold all right action and conceptions of the 
good is reducible to virtue.
25
 Contrary to this point, while virtue is certainly a central ethical 
concept for virtue ethics, Hursthouse argues that there are other considerations that inform our 
concept of the good that are separable from virtue. For example, virtue ethics often considers 
what is good for the human organism, which is more easily understood in terms of biological or 
other naturalistic concepts. What benefits a human being’s health and well-being sometime 
informs conceptions of virtue.
26
 Philippa Foot’s discussion of euthanasia, done from the 
perspective of virtue ethics, includes such discussion of what is good and to the benefit of the 
human organism.
27
 The practice of discussing important moral concepts which are not reducible 
                                                          
24
 Hursthouse (1999:79). 
25
 For example, see Hudson (1986:42-3) 
26
 Hursthouse (1999:82). 
27
 Foot (1977:54). 
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to virtue continues in more contemporary accounts of virtue ethics. Lorraine Besser-Jones, for 
example, highlights the particulars of psychological well-being for human organisms in her 
account of virtue ethics. 
Virtue, while central to most any account of virtue ethics, is not the lone foundation of 
virtue ethics. It’s important to keep this is mind for subsequent discussion of critics of virtue 
ethics, as they should not be understood as targeting the entirety of the virtue ethics tradition. 
While the prominent critiques of virtue ethics focus on conceptions of character and virtue, the 
goal is not the wholesale denial of the entirety of the virtue ethics tradition. Indeed, as I argue in 
chapter 5, critics of virtue ethics can be understood as showing promising directions for future 
development of virtue ethics. Hursthouse’s identification of important non-virtue moral concepts 
to the tradition of virtue ethics, in part, opens the door for so-called alternative accounts of 
virtue. 
IV. The Virtues 
Virtues are understood as an enduring feature of the agent. A virtuous person does not act 
well under some conditions and not others, but across situations and contexts as a result of an 
appropriate internal constitution. Most virtue ethical accounts posit what have been termed 
‘global’ character traits, which are traits that reliably manifest certain behaviors across a wide 
variety of trait-relevant situations (Doris 2002, Miller 2013).
28
 For example, the courageous 
individual will reliably behave courageously across a wide variety of courage-relevant situations. 
But what exactly are the virtues? Aristotle, of course, has list of virtues, with familiar members 
such as courage, patience, temperance and truthfulness. Among those discussed in everyday 
conversations are also the virtues of compassion and loyalty. Contemporary discussions of virtue 
expand on classical lists, or investigate new dimensions of virtues, such as the identification of 
                                                          
28
 I discuss global traits in more detail in chapter 2. 
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‘social intelligence.’29 The specifics of any single virtue would provide enough material for 
lengthy in-depth discussions. For my purposes though, it is not so much the specifics of the 
virtue that are most relevant, but rather the implications and structure of virtue possession. 
Different approaches to virtue ethics will have different commitments to the structure of virtues, 
so discussions of virtue ethics need to be specific about which traditions are being targeted. 
For many accounts of virtue ethics, self-control appears necessary for the development of 
a variety of virtues, including temperance (the ability to refrain from over-indulgence in sensual 
pleasures), courage (the ability to face or control one’s fears), and justice (which often requires 
restraining one’s self-interested motives). Indeed, self-control is often identified as one of the 
main reasons to understand virtue as a unified whole, rather than discrete character traits one 
develops individual.
30
 For each of the above virtues, and others, a prerequisite of possessing 
virtue is being the sort of actor who has an enduring disposition to be unmoved by the kinds of 
feelings and emotions that might overwhelm their capacity to know and desire the right course of 
action. At times this is also identified as ‘integrity’. An agent with integrity is a unified or whole 
individual with a strong resistance to distractions, such as short-term pressures or temptations 
that would interfere with right action.
31
 So while there are different ways of understanding 
particular virtues, their role in guiding the act in certain ways and maintaining some kind of 
resistance to irrelevant concerns is found throughout discussions of virtue. Miller (2013:208) 
outlines what he calls ‘platitudes’ about virtue ethics: 
(i) A person who is virtuous, when acting in character, will typically attempt to perform 
virtuous actions when, at the very least, the need to do so is obvious and the effort 
involved is very minimal. 
                                                          
29
 Snow (2010).  
30
 Annas (2011:104). 
31
 Solomon (1999:328). 
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(ii) A person’s virtuous trait will not be dependent on the presence (or absence) of certain 
morally problematic [environmental or personal psychological factors]  in leading 
him to perform virtuous actions, such that if they were or were not present, then his 
frequency of acting virtuously would significantly increase or decrease in the same 
nominal situations. 
(iii) A person’s virtuous trait will typically lead to virtuous behavior that is done at least 
primarily for motivating reasons which are morally admirable and deserving of moral 
praise, and not primarily for motivating reasons which are either morally problematic 
or morally neutral. 
(iv) A virtuous person, when acting in character, does not regularly act from egoistic 
motives which are often powerful enough that, were they not present, he would not 
continue to reliable act virtuously, as his virtuous motives are not strong enough to 
motivate such behavior by themselves. 
These platitudes helpfully identify much of the structure of virtue found throughout the virtue 
ethics literature. Point (ii) in particular summarizes the importance of things like self-control and 
integrity of the virtuous agent. Virtue possession implies much about the motivational structure 
of the agent, not only what reasons for action they are sensitive to, but that certain reasons 
provide sufficient motivational force for the agent to act. It is hopefully becoming clear that 
virtues are complex dispositions. As an “enduring feature of the agent,” virtue possession 
provides a deep description of the types of considerations relevant to the agent. 
The complexity of virtue makes simply listing various virtues as an explanation of virtue 
ethics a bit shallow. Recall the example of honesty, where it is expected that most people could 
come up with a list of things honest people tend to do. But possession of the virtue of honesty 
 
 
15 
 
isn’t simply telling the full truth at every opportunity. Full disclosure of all of one’s inner 
thoughts and feelings is a sure way to ruin most social gatherings. The virtuous person, in 
exercising their honesty, provides an “appropriate level” of honesty. The same holds true for 
things like courage and charity. This is not just a reiteration of the mean between two extremes, 
but rather to expand on it. Because the particulars of any given situation many significantly shift 
what we think of as virtuous action, there is a general demand for excellent reasoning and 
deliberation on the part of the agent. Being honest isn’t just about doing honest things, but being 
able to determine what the honest thing actually is, given the particular situation. The crucial 
point here is that there are numerous aspects of virtue that need to be fleshed out and described 
by any given account of virtue ethics. This has led to independent investigations of virtue, 
separable from a version of virtue ethics proper. 
Some argue that one cannot truly possess one virtue without possessing all of the others. 
The practical wisdom, for example, necessary for the appropriate level of truth telling is 
inseparable from the practical wisdom need for the appropriate level of courage. That idea is that 
there is really only a single virtue, practical wisdom, or in a slightly weaker form, the possession 
of one virtue is positively correlated with the possession of others. The coincidence of virtue is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘Unity of the Virtues’.32 For my purposes in this dissertation, the 
individuation (or lack thereof) of the virtues matters little. The relevant structure of virtue and the 
empirical implications of that structure, discussed in more detail in chapter 2, remains the same 
whether there are many virtues or only a single one. 
To be clear, not all theories of virtue, and thus not all versions of virtue ethics, posit 
similar structures of virtue. Of particular note are instrumentalist accounts of virtue. For 
instrumentalist views, there is no intrinsic value to any particular state of character. A state of 
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character is valuable insofar as it is instrumentally valuable in bringing about particular states of 
affairs. Some instrumentalist views focus on traits which produce the best consequences, while 
others focus on the psychological well-being of the agent themselves. Julia Driver argues for a 
consequentialist view of virtue where the particular traits of character that are most conducive to 
bringing about the best possible consequences for others are the virtues. For examples, traits of 
character that dispose us donating money to charitable causes are virtues, not because of some 
intrinsic value to selfless donation, but because charities bring about better states of affairs for 
many people.
33
 Lorraine Besser-Jones’ view identifies the virtues as those traits which contribute 
to personal mental health and flourishing. An example of a virtue for Besser-Jones is a trait that 
contributes to feelings of relatability and inclusion with our peers. Similar to Driver’s account, 
the value of the virtue is not from relatedness being an intrinsically valuable trait (as it might be 
for Aristotle’s own virtuous mean for ‘social conduct’), but rather that feelings of relatedness 
contribute to the psychological well-being of human beings.
34
 Instrumentalist views are a 
significant departure from many traditional approaches to virtue ethics, though they still maintain 
particular traits of character as the primary target of moral concern.
35
   
V. The Pre-Virtuous State 
While the possession of virtue is one of the developmental goals of virtue ethics, most 
people aren’t in a virtuous state. Indeed, most people will likely never attain full virtue. This 
raises the question of how we should understand the pre-virtuous states most of us find ourselves 
in. One way to understand the pre-virtuous states is to identify what it is about such states that 
make them fall short of virtue ones.  
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Aristotle’s original accounting of pre-virtuous states provides a helpful starting point for 
understanding them. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies such states as internal 
conditions of disharmony. Symptoms of such states involve agents making a decision about a 
particular course of action, but then experiencing some kind of passionate interference (EN 
1166bff). That there is interference of this kind is indicative of a lack of virtue, even if the agent 
ends up doing what a virtuous agent would in those circumstances. Such people are referred to 
by Aristotle as “continent” (enkrates). Those for whom the passionate interference ends up 
distributing the intended behavior are “incontinent” (akrates). Finally, there are those for whom 
compassion and justice and the like hold negligible value, and are generally governed by the 
passions which present difficultly for the continent and the incontinent. These are the vicious or 
evil people for Aristotle (kakos; phaulos).
36
 Particularly for the continent and incontinent, a 
single instance of passionate interference is not sufficient for being completely excluded from 
the category of virtue. The pre-virtuous states are described as chronic conditions, not one-off 
events.  
The incontinent state is of particular interest not only to virtue ethics as a whole, but also 
for much of this dissertation. Passionate interference that ends with a failure to act well for the 
incontinent can be consciously experienced after going through careful deliberation (propeteia) 
or unconsciously guiding the agent as well (astheneia) (EN 1149aff). This is often described as 
“akratic” behavior in the virtue ethics literature. While Aristotle goes on to individuate various 
types of akratic behavior, based on the particular type of passion which does the interfering (e.g., 
anger, pleasure, etc.), what’s important to understand is that this form of chronic interference is 
short-circuiting what is normally understood to be correct deliberation. 
                                                          
36
 See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue). 
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Falling short of virtue, then, can take many forms. One can fail to be sensitive to the 
appropriate kinds of reasons, deliberate about those reasons poorly, or just have that properly 
reason-sensitive deliberation interfered with by the passions. Such allowances remain in the 
contemporary virtue ethics tradition as well, for someone acting “out of character” is hardly a 
strange occurrence, virtuous or otherwise. Hursthouse notes there are numerous ways in which 
someone may understandably act out of character, as when they are “exhausted, dazed with grief, 
ill, drunk (through no serious fault of their own, we must suppose), shell-shocked, and so on. 
These are the sorts of conditions in which we are surprised if people are ‘not themselves’.”37 For 
now, it is enough to understand that momentary and understandable lapses in acting well are to 
be expected, and do not necessarily disqualify someone from being virtuous or continent. But if 
most of us are in one of the above pre-virtuous states, one can wonder how it is we can approach 
a more virtuous state. This leads to another important aspect of the virtue ethics tradition – virtue 
development. 
VI. Virtue Development 
Thus far I’ve discussed general conceptions of virtue, the relationship between virtue and 
action, and a few important structural features of virtue. While mentioned in brief earlier, I now 
turn to the development of virtue in more detail. No one argues that everyone is virtuous from 
the start, even if we might have many pre-theoretical conceptions of virtue that we learn at 
“mother’s knee.” Virtue ethics is sometimes described as a theory that answers the question 
“what kind of person should I be?” rather than “what should I do?” That is, it is agent-focused 
rather than act-focused. An additional demand on a virtue ethical theory, which might not be 
found in a consequentialist or deontological theory, is to provide an account of how one could 
develop, or at least approach, a virtuous state of character. 
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For many accounts of virtue ethics, going back to Aristotle, habituation is often stressed 
as a crucial component of virtue development.
38
 Habituation leads to virtue because it aids in 
recognizing certain features of a situation as important reasons for deciding to act in a certain 
way (EN 2.I 1103b). Indeed, virtue has often been likened to, in part, a particular kind of 
perceptual capacity. McDowell notes, Virtue “On each of the relevant occasions, the requirement 
imposed by the situation, and detected by the agent’s sensitivity to such requirements, must 
exhaust his reason for acting as he does.”39 The early development of virtue is often situation 
specific, viz., one learns to be honest by simply being told to tell the truth on a particular 
occasion. Annas notes that we slowly build our conceptions of virtue “in a multitude of 
embedded contexts, which can stand in various relations, from overlapping to conflicting … 
often it is not obvious at the time that we are learning to be generous or brave in learning how 
[to] do things; most people discern this only much later.”40 But even outside of the context of 
Annas’ skill analogy, the importance of practice and reflection is cited as crucial for virtue 
development. In other work, Annas observes that “virtue is developed through intelligent 
decisions and results in more intelligent deliberation and decision.”41  
Similar to developing virtues from an embedded context, other accounts of virtue 
development cite the importance of virtues with a much more narrow scope than normally 
assumed. For instance, developing a virtue of honesty within my personal relationships, even if I 
seem to lack such a virtue in my professional life. This is sometimes described as the 
“modularity of virtues”, where virtue development is sometimes a result of collecting individual 
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virtue-like component parts.
42
 One can think of this as slowly assembling the parts to a larger 
machine. Each component should be properly tuned and in good working order, but one fails to 
have the larger machine until all of the parts are united in the right kind of way. The modularity 
account is a bit different than habituation. Habituation involves progression towards fully 
virtuous action, with virtue developing as one comes to appreciate important similarities in 
difference between all of the various contexts. As Snow notes, “if a trait starts out by being 
narrow and local, perhaps as a response to a subjective interpretation of one type of objective 
situation or encounter, it need not remain confined to the same type of objective situation, but 
can be generalized across objectively different situation-types.”43 Within the modularity account, 
however, one might be able to act exactly as the virtuous agent would act, just in a more limited 
scope. 
Despite some variety in conceptions of virtue, and how it might be developed in any 
given individual, one important takeaway from this part of the virtue ethics tradition is the 
importance of actual instantiation of particular traits. Virtue ethics not only frames the virtuous 
agent as an evaluative standard and the criteria for right action, but also as a developmental goal 
for a given agent. Certainly, there is no expectation that all people will develop into the virtuous 
agent. And even for those that might reach the virtuous state, the expectation is often described 
as a life-long pursuit – hardly something to be picked up in a few years. The point remains 
though that much of virtue ethics focuses on agent acquiring particular traits, and that these traits 
are to assist in not only right action, but human excellence on the whole. 
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VII. Concluding Thoughts 
In this chapter, I’ve provided a general overview of the virtue ethics tradition, and its 
primary domains of focus. Right action, for the virtue ethicists, involves the characteristic 
exercise of particular traits of character, namely virtues. Virtues are not only important for right 
action, but also concern the overall well-being of the agent. To be virtuous is not only to do the 
right thing in most cases, but to also be an excellent human being. Like any great moral tradition 
in philosophy, particular accounts of virtue ethics will part ways on various important issues. It 
has not been my goal to identify the most-promising or most-popular accounts of virtue ethics, 
but merely to highlight what sets virtue ethics apart from other normative traditions. While 
proponents of virtue ethics are sure to be concerned with the consequences of actions, or the 
value of principles of duty and obligation, such concerns are often secondary to the concept 
virtue. Importantly though, the important moral concepts of virtue ethics are not all reducible to 
virtue. While right action may be inseparable from virtue, other goods and excellences of human 
beings have important relevance for virtue ethics as well. 
While the technical details of virtue ethics can be as complex and intricate as any other 
moral theory, virtue ethics is often described as having the appeal of recruiting evaluative 
concepts most people make use of in their day-to-day life. We praise the compassionate and 
condemn the dishonest. As Annas notes, “part of the attraction of an ethics of virtue has always 
been the point that virtue is familiar and recognizable by all.”44 The familiar and strong 
connection to personal psychology, however, has recently opened virtue ethics up to a particular 
brand of empirical-based criticism. While naturalistic challenges to moral theories are by no 
means novel, the strong connection of virtue ethics to particular dispositional structures and the 
importance for character development has set the stage for a particular brand of empirical-based 
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critique. While I’ve gestured at some general empirical commitments in the preceding 
discussion, more specific details are needed in order to identify any particular vulnerability for 
certain forms of virtue ethics. In the next chapter, I outline the most threatening form of 
empirical-based criticism of virtue ethics, as well as the specific empirical commitments many 
theories of virtue ethics have which makes the empirical criticism applicable in the first place. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
SITUATIONISM AND EMPIRICAL COMMITMENTS OF VIRTUE 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Situationism has a long history in psychology.
1
 More recently, it has emerged as a 
philosophical view as well, primarily critiquing various versions of virtue ethics.
2
 Situationists 
argue that, given the available empirical data, we should to be highly skeptical of the widespread 
of instantiation of particular kinds of character trait in the adult population.
 3
 The skeptical claim 
of situationists is that the ethical understanding of character - consisting in global traits effecting 
consistent behavior across differing situations --is undermined by a large body of findings in 
empirical psychology.  Put simply, the situationist claim is that people don’t often behave as 
consistently as familiar theories of character would have us expect. The primary challenge to 
virtue ethical theories is that the developmental goal of a virtuous character (or even near-
virtuous character) is much too unrealistic, given its commitment to global character traits. As a 
result, the situationist empirical claim is sometimes paired with a normative claim that traditional 
notions of virtue should be eliminated from ethical thought. For the remainder of this work, I 
refer to the ongoing philosophical debate between situationists and defenders of virtue ethics as 
the character debate. In this chapter, I outline the general situationist argument against virtue 
ethics and identify the empirical commitments of virtue ethics which make it vulnerable to the 
situationist argument in the first place. 
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3
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Defenders of virtue ethics have argued that situationists claim character does not exist at 
all,
4
 or that situationists can only threaten crude versions of character related to automatic, non-
rational mechanical processes.
5
 Situationists have argued that broadly Aristotelian versions of 
virtue ethics require firm and unchanging characters that yield predictable, overt behavior,
6
 or 
that virtue ethics requires wide-spread instantiation of certain virtuous traits.
7
 These descriptions 
misrepresent both sides of the character debate. In this chapter, in order to avoid contributing to 
this unproductive discussion, I identify the strongest version of the situationist argument, and 
argue for the specific empirical commitments made by various virtue ethical theories in order to 
clarify the landscape of the character debate. As was pointed out in chapter 1, there is no single 
theory of virtue ethics. Despite this, there is enough commonalty among virtue ethical theories 
that some clear empirical commitments do exist. Importantly, the empirical commitments I 
identify should not be construed as necessary for all versions of virtue ethics – different theories 
have different commitments. After clarifying both the situationist argument against virtue ethics 
and the specific empirical commitments of many virtue ethical theories, the strength of the 
empirical evidence cited by situationists can be better evaluated. 
In sections II – IV, I layout the general situationist argument, and argue for key premises. 
In section V, I consider the one of the most common responses to situationist arguments that 
virtue is a rare ideal, and argue why it fails to address the situationist argument. Section VI 
describes the limits of the situationist argument, while Section VII concerns potential candidates 
for the relevant type of behavior that is indicative of trait and virtue possession. Section VIII 
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identifies broader empirical commitments of virtue ethics. Finally, I conclude in Section IX and 
set the stage for an in-depth discussion of the empirical data in next chapter. 
II. The Situationist Argument against Virtue Ethics 
Situationists argue that global character traits are not widely instantiated in the adult 
population, and that global character traits are essential to virtue ethical understandings of 
character and virtue.
8
 Both critics and defenders of virtue ethics alike understand a character trait 
to be global if it is both consistent and stable.
 9
 A trait is consistent if trait-relevant behavior 
reliably manifests across a wide variety of trait-relevant situations. Sara’s honesty is consistent 
because she performs the honesty-relevant behavior in most or all aspects of her life. That is, she 
is honest at home, at work, when she is with friends, and when she is traveling, to name only a 
few. A trait is stable if trait-relevant behavior manifests over time in the same way in similar 
trait-relevant situations. Sara’s honesty is stable if her honesty is an enduring feature of her over 
time.
10
 ‘Behavior’ should be understood very broadly and not merely overt behavior. While 
behavior can certainly include overt behavior, the type of behavior identified as relevant for trait 
or virtue possession varies among virtue ethical theories. Part of the strength of the situationist 
argument is that it applies to such a broad range of behaviors. Potential types of behaviors 
indicative of trait possession are discussed in detail in Section VII.  
The general situationist argument against virtue ethics is best understood as follows:
11
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 At times in the debate, “robust” has been used instead of “global”. Nothing turns on the particular phrasing. For 
consistency, I only refer to global traits. 
9
 For situationists, see Doris (2002:22); Merritt et al. (2010), Alfano (2013:62), and for defenders of character/virtue 
ethics see Miller (2003), Russell (2009), Snow (2010), and Annas (2011). 
10
 “Evaluative integrability” is also cited as a feature of global traits, which implies that possession of certain traits 
(virtues in particular) is probabilistically related to the possession of similar traits. This feature receives little 
attention in the character debate, so I leave it aside. 
11
 Modified from Merrit et al. (2005). 
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(1) If systematic (e.g., scientific) observation reveals pervasive behavioral inconsistency, 
then behavior is not typically governed by global traits. 
(2) Systematic observation reveals pervasive behavioral inconsistency. 
(3) So, behavior is not typically governed by global traits. 
(4) If behavior is not typically governed by global traits, then virtue ethical theories 
committed to global traits have little relevance to humans such as they are. 
Therefore,  
(5) Virtue ethical theories committed to global traits have little relevance to humans such as 
they are. 
There are, of course, other ways of articulating the situationist argument.
12
 The above 
formulation, however, captures the generality and main tenants of situationism. Other 
descriptions of the general situationist argument often focus on virtues and vices, rather than 
character traits in general. Furthermore, situationism has often been misinterpreted as an 
argument for the nonexistence or impossibility of character traits.
13
 This, despite rather clear 
claims to the contrary made by prominent situationists.
14
 
While the above argument is valid, there is obviously disagreement as to its soundness. In the 
coming sections I clarifying key premises in the argument, and argue for their truth. An 
argument for (2) requires extensive review of the available empirical evidence, which will be the 
focus of chapter 3. 
III. Pervasive Behavioral Inconsistency 
Premise (1) of the general situationist argument states that, “If systematic (e.g., scientific) 
observation reveals pervasive behavioral inconsistency, then behavior is not typically governed 
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 Miller (forthcoming: 192),and Alzola (2008:347; 2012:348). 
13
 Flanagan (2009:55), Sreenivasan (2002). 
14
 E.g., Doris and Stich (2005). 
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by global traits.” As stated above, since global traits require consistency, observable 
inconsistency is a potential threat to the possession of global traits. Importantly though, it is an 
inconsistency in behavior. As stated earlier, the rich literature of virtue ethics does not settle on 
any single type of behavior as the one most relevant for the possession of particular character 
traits or virtues. For the situationist argument to be as relevant to virtue ethics as it is purported 
to be, “behavioral inconsistency” should be read as including a broad range of behaviors. 
Situationist arguments do not, for example, merely target versions of virtue ethics focused on 
overt behavior, but instead threaten a wide variety of virtue ethical accounts. 
Not just any inconsistency will do for the situationist argument though, as (1) requires a 
pervasive behavioral inconsistency. The inconsistency is pervasive insofar as it occurs in 
multiple situations and contexts as opposed to some kind of isolated inconsistency. For example, 
if the situationist were to argue that behavioral inconsistency found during the commute to work 
were enough to undermine virtue ethics, the situationist argument would be understandably 
suspect. The behavioral inconsistency should be widespread. 
But what is it to behave inconsistently? If people act compassionately one day to a 
stranger-in-need and indifferent the next, is this enough to support the situationist charge of 
inconsistency? Even assuming that we are talking about the relevant kind of behavior, this isn’t 
necessarily the kind of inconsistency the situationist relies on for their argument. Going by the 
general definition mentioned above, the inconsistency would be trait-relevant behavior not 
reliably manifesting across the relevant trait-relevant situations. The conditions that support the 
appropriateness of particular behaviors in one situation should support them when the conditions 
occur again (absent appropriate countervailing conditions). Keeping with the above example, a 
shift in the compassion I show the stranger-in-need should be accompanied by a shift in those 
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factors deemed appropriate for governing compassion. For example, assume I help a stranger-in-
need one day, but fail to the next. If it came to light that my failure to help was in a situation the 
rendering of aid would put me in severe danger (which was not present in the first case), a charge 
of inconsistency is hardly appropriate. But if the shift in behavior is attributed to irrelevant 
changes in the situation, one can start doubting the consistency of my compassion. 
The natural question here is what counts as an irrelevant change in the situation. 
Situationists appear to rely on general intuitive agreement about what kinds of things count as 
irrelevant changes. Merritt et al. (2005) note that situationism is supported by “just how 
insubstantial the situational influences that produce troubling moral failures seem to be.”15 
Earlier works by Doris (2002) and Harman (1999) make similar claims. The reliance here 
appears to be something like relevant factors being defensible as a reason for the behavior. This 
is, of course, quite amenable to discussions of virtue ethics. Russell (2009:344) notes, “Acting 
from or exercising a virtue is one kind of acting for a reason” and Hursthouse (2003:127) argues 
that virtue is “the wholehearted acceptance of a certain range of considerations as reasons for 
action.” The situationist is highlighting situational factors that appear to have a significant impact 
on behavior, but that are largely indefensible as a reason for action. So for premise (1), the 
thought is that if there is enough systematic observation of significant behavioral influence by 
indefensible situational factors, this is sufficient evidence for the behavioral inconsistency, which 
undermines possession of global traits. Virtues are a type of global traits, so if most people fail to 
even have non-virtuous global traits, the prospect of possessing virtuous traits becomes even 
more problematic. I consider this line of thought in more detail in Section V. 
Another important aspect of the argument is that inconsistency is not secured by single 
failures of consistency. The situationist argument is not an argument based single failures to act 
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consistently. Situationists readily admit that direct evidence for or against a particular person’s 
possession of one kind of character trait or another would require long term, systematic 
observation of that individual.
16
 Instead, in interpreting experimental results to support their 
argument, situationists are best understood as appealing to inference to the best explanation. 
Having an “off-day” or momentary lapse of character makes sense when considering a single 
person. However, to claim that the results of so many of the studies cited by situationists are best 
explained by so many participants having their “off-day”, rather than the experimental 
conditions, strains credulity. Again, one of the empirical claims made by situationists is that most 
people’s behavior is pushed around by irrelevant factors.  As noted in Merritt et al. (2005:357): 
“it is not that people fail standards for good conduct, but that people can be induced to do so with 
such ease.” Christian Miller argues evidence cited by situationists to support inconsistency points 
to “surprising” factors that significantly impact our behavior.17 What it is we actually respond to 
seems to vary widely, resulting inconsistent behavior. 
Inconsistency then is to be understood as changes in behavior when the relevant 
situational factors have remained constant, but only irrelevant factors have changed. Again, 
going back to the example of showing compassion to the stranger-in-need, on the subsequent 
occasion where I failed to help the stranger-in-need, it would need to be the case that the only 
difference between the situations are irrelevant ones for it to be a case of inconsistency. The 
natural question to ask here is what exactly differentiates an irrelevant factor for a relevant one. I 
provide specific criteria for identifying such factors in chapter 3. My goal here was to link 
behavioral inconsistency with changes a particular type of factor.  
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Although the focus this section, including and my own examples, has referenced overt 
behavior, I want to re-emphasize that the situationist argument does not only apply to character 
traits associated with overt behavior. In the next section, I provide reasons to accept (4). As 
stated earlier, the evidence for (2) is discussed in detail in chapter 3, and (3) is merely an 
application of modus ponens of (1) and (2). 
IV. Relevance of Humans Such As They Are 
Premise (4) is the final component of the argument that demands some further 
justification. Premise (4) states “If behavior is not typically governed by global traits, then virtue 
ethical theories committed to global traits have little relevance to humans such as they are.” This 
is an exceptionally strong claim that requires additional clarification.  
From its beginning, the character debate has been about virtue ethical theories that deal 
with global traits. While there is disagreement over what kind of behavior matters for global trait 
possession, a commitment to global traits remains. Importantly, premise (4) restricts the 
situationist argument to only those virtue ethical theories that cite the importance actual virtue 
possession, such as those theories which require at least something similar to a virtue in order to 
secure right action. Premise (4) amounts to the following: if the vast majority of people lack 
global traits (to say nothing of a virtue), the developmental goal of virtue possession is 
problematic for human beings such as they are. In short, virtues are not just sensitivities to a 
particular class of reasons, but a different kind of sensitivity entirely.   
Despite there being good reasons to accept premise (4), I actually think this is where 
defenders of virtue ethics have the most promise for pushing back on the situationist argument. If 
there were a robust account of how one might go about developing global traits of character from 
typical states of character, the prospect of then reaching the further goal of virtuous global traits 
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would be much more plausible. To my knowledge, however, no one has argued for such an 
account.
18
 Another way of resisting (4) is to highlight the rarity of virtue, and that widespread 
behavior contrary to virtuous behavior is not at all a problem for virtue ethics. This way of 
resisting (4) has become known as the rarity response to situationism, which is the focus of the 
next section.  
V. The Rarity Response to the Situationist Argument 
Thus far, I’ve outlined the situationist argument against virtue ethics, and argued for most 
of the premises.
19
 In response to the situationist, some have claimed that the situationist 
argument merely demonstrates the difficulty of being a virtuous agent.
20
 Additionally, the 
difficulty of virtue is hardly a surprise, and doesn’t require evidence from empirical psychology 
to back it up. From some of the earliest versions for virtue ethics, stretching back to Aristotle, 
attaining virtue is described as a life-long endeavor. Furthermore, virtue possession also requires 
specific kinds of education, social support, and dedication on the part of the moral agent.
21
 That 
experimental results show a great many people fail standards of right action, for whatever reason, 
is not only unsurprising, but platitudinous. Call this the rarity response to situationism.   
Before the character debate gained wide-spread attention, Doris anticipated the rarity 
response to situationist evidence. Doris notes that defenders of virtue ethics, “can argue as 
follows: the situationist research may show that the ordinary person’s character is not as sturdy 
as we might hope . . . such disappointing demographics are exactly what the virtue theorist 
would expect.”22 Doris goes on to argue that virtue being an exceptionally rare ideal may cause 
                                                          
18
 It’s worth noting both psychological and philosophical work has begun investigating virtue development more 
seriously, which might offer defenders of virtue ethics a promising response to the situationist argument. See Snow 
(ed.) (2014). 
19
 With a promise to return to the empirical data in chapter 3.  
20
 For examples of this defense, see Sreenvisan (2002), Miller (2003), Kamtekar (2004), Annas (2005). 
21
 E.g., Annas (2011) stresses the importance of some kind of teacher of virtue. 
22
 Doris (1998: 511). 
 32 
 
problems for moral education, since it seems strange to hold up a goal that so few could ever 
attain.
23
 But if this were all the situationist was after, one might expect the general situationist 
argument to have a premise that stated “behavior is not typically governed by virtuous traits.” 
But this discussion is about global traits, not just virtuous ones. This seemingly 
misunderstanding of the target of situationism is why the rarity response fails. 
Notice how in describing the rarity response, talk has importantly shifted to the rarity of 
virtue, rather than the rarity of global traits. These are two very different claims. As I’ve pointed 
out, the situationist is best understood as claiming the later, though that certainly implies a rarity 
of virtue. If even morally undemanding global traits are also rare, then even something like 
Aristotle’s continent moral agent might be far out of reach for the regular person.24  Far from 
being a potential defense for virtue ethics, a rarity response which properly interprets the 
situationist argument accepts the rarity of global traits. This simply concedes a key premise to 
the situationist, premise (3) above. 
 Even when focusing on virtue, as pointed out by Jesse Prinz, the rarity response 
presupposes the developmental issue I’ve been discussing. In claiming that human beings could 
potentially become virtuous prepossess the development of psychological structures necessary 
for global character traits. Certainly, the evidence cited by situationists has not proven global 
trait structures are impossible to develop. With Prinz, I think the wealth of experimental data 
puts the burden of proof is on the defenders of virtue ethics to show why it is reasonable to think 
human beings could even possess global character traits.
25
 
To sharpen the above point here a bit, what is, at best, rare is possession of the kind the 
ability to respond in a consistent manner across situations that might only differ in minor, 
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morally irrelevant ways. The inconsistency in behavior demonstrated by the empirical evidence 
cited by situationists points to a psychology consisting of global traits is one that is different in 
kind compared to most people, rather than a difference in degree. A psychology consisting in 
global traits seems discontinuous from the vast majority of the population.  
Consider an extreme, though instructive example. One could develop a normative theory 
of human athletic ability that claims a developmental goal of possessing the ability to compete at 
the top Olympic levels in weightlifting, marathon running, and gymnastics. But is this really an 
appropriate developmental goal for human beings such as they are? Certainly there are baseline 
habits related to developing skills in all the above sports that would be beneficial for people to 
practice. But given what we know about the limits of the human body, having the right balance 
of strength, agility, and endurance to compete at such a high level in all of these sports seems 
highly implausible.  At the very least, I think we would expect a proponent of this normative 
account of human athletic ability to give us some idea of how someone could possibly start to 
work towards this physical ideal. 
Another reason to doubt the appropriateness of the rarity response is that evidence cited 
by situationists does not only concern situations where one might think the possession of virtue 
is needed for right action. The failure to respond consistently in even low-demand situations is 
supported by numerous experimental studies, reviewed more thoroughly in chapter 3, where 
subjects are presented with relatively undemanding opportunities to act in a way consistent with 
common notions of honesty and decency. One study found that making a room slightly darker 
led to more people cheating on a test in order to earn more money for themselves.
26
 That same 
study found that cheating behavior also increased when subjects were wearing sunglasses. 
Another study found people in an office environment were less likely to abstain from 
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contributing to the communal beverage fund in the break room when there was a picture of 
human eyes posted on the wall.
27
 The rare feature among these participants appears to be an 
ability to consistently respond to very low-demanding reasons for acting honestly. Again, it is 
not as though such studies show a failure of living up to the highest standards of virtue.  
  Without any apparent baseline of global trait structures, the virtue ethical goal of 
developing a particular type of global trait, namely virtues, becomes much more daunting. Here 
is where the point about virtue ethics having “little relevance to humans such as they are” 
becomes clearer. The discontinuity between the standard psychological structures of most human 
beings, viz. non-global traits, and the particular goals of many virtue ethical theories, the 
attainment of virtuous, global traits, demands a developmental account on the part of the virtue 
ethicist. In short, many of the versions of virtue ethics discussed in chapter 1 are at best 
incomplete.
28
 The long tradition of virtue ethics as a normative theory encouraging the 
development of a particular type of agent is one of the main reasons is open to the type of 
criticism offered by situationists. 
 To take stock for a moment, so far I’ve outlined the situationist argument against virtue 
ethics and, with the exception of the empirical claim in premise (2) that will be discussed in 
chapter 3, argued for each of the premises. I then went on to argue why the most common 
response to the situationist argument, the rarity response, fails to address situationist worries. The 
reasons why the rarity response fails supports (4) in the general situationist argument as well. 
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 The remainder of this chapter concerns the limits of the situationist argument and specific 
empirical commitments found in various versions of virtue ethics. Since the situationist argument 
is based on empirical evidence, it is important that virtue ethical theories actually have empirical 
commitments in the first place. In particular, that whatever kind of behavior is identified to be 
the trait-relevant behavior in a given virtue ethical theory is both empirically trackable and what 
it means for that behavior to be inconsistent is coherent.  
VI. The Limits of the Situationist Argument 
This section may seem to be an odd inclusion to this chapter, as there are a great many 
things that the situationist argument isn’t about. The topic, however, is of great importance, 
given the landscape of the character debate. Too often the situationist argument has been cast as 
a claim about the non-existence of character traits, full stop. People on both sides of the character 
debate typically agree that traits exist; the question concerns how traits are best construed.
29
 The 
disagreement, as this chapter has meant to point out, is over the existence of global traits. 
Situationism is not a Skinner-esque version of behaviorism. As Alfano (2013:74-75) notes, while 
overt behavior is usually highlighted, situationists also target other processes like deliberation 
and construal. Admittedly, early philosophical papers by those friendly to the situationist line 
have contributed to the misrepresentation of the situationist position.
30
 Early, bold moves in any 
particular philosophical debate are hardly rare, but unfortunately many people taking part in the 
character debate continue to reference those early moves as being representative of the 
situationist position.
31
 Those friendly to the situationist position have even argued for a 
revisionary view of character traits, such as so-called “local trait” theory.32 Such views posit the 
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existence of character traits, just not global character traits. Such local trait views do not evade 
empirical criticism either, though they are not the target of the situationist argument.
33
 Most, if 
not all, situationists remain interactionists: features of the situation interact with our psychology 
(character traits, personality traits, etc.) to produce behavior. The disagreement is over the types 
of traits that we have or could reasonable develop. 
Situationists also do not argue for the elimination of any and all talk of virtue ethics. As 
referenced in chapter 1, and made more explicit in chapter 5, there are virtue ethical theories 
which are not at all threatened by situationist arguments. With the situationist argument in full 
view, along with its limits, I turn to specific types of empirical commitments made by certain 
virtue ethical theories with respect to potential behaviors of interest. In each case where the 
behavior is identified, the expectation on the part of the virtue ethicist is that the behavior will 
manifest across different situations when appropriate to a reasonable degree or regularity. 
VII. Virtue and Trait-Relevant Behavior 
Recall that the situationist argument largely rests on the observation of pervasive 
behavioral inconsistency. Generally speaking, a trait is consistent if trait-relevant behavior 
reliably manifests across a wide variety of trait-relevant situations. The types of trait-relevant 
behaviors situationists claim to be inconsistent are those types of behaviors associated with 
virtue possession. This raises the question of what exactly are the trait-relevant behaviors 
associated with virtue possession. After identifying the behavior(s), it can be determined if the 
specific behavior(s) are subject to the kind of inconsistency situationists base their argument 
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on.
34
 In this section, I identify the most prominent types of behavior associated with virtue 
possession in the virtue ethics literature. 
a. Perception 
The virtuous agent is at times described as being more sensitive to noticing the demands 
of particular situations via a well-developed perception.  McDowell describes this perception as a 
certain kind of detection of situational features.
35
 He goes on to make the stronger claim that a 
non-virtuous agent couldn’t even have the same kind of perceptions as that of the virtuous 
agent.
36
 Swanton notes that virtue is, in part, a disposition to acknowledge those items relevant to 
virtue, which can include perception.
37
 So for some accounts of virtue, perception itself, distinct 
from any deep interpretation, constitutes an important part of virtue possession.
38
 Perception, of 
course, does not exhaust any conception of virtue. Perception is often grouped with some of the 
further behaviors discussed below. 
b. Construal 
No agent, virtuous or otherwise, is simply a passive receptor of unmitigated sense data 
about the real world. There is always some element of interpretation on the part of the agent. 
How an agent interprets or understands a particular situation is their construal of the situation. 
Perceiving particular aspects of a situation and construing those same aspects in a certain kind of 
way are two separate, though still related, processes. I can perceive someone lying on the 
ground, bleeding, without necessarily construing them as in danger, or in need of help, or even in 
need of help by me.  The importance of construal figures predominantly in more recent responses 
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to situationist arguments against virtue ethics (discussed in detail in chapter 4). In broad stokes, 
focusing on construal is shifts focus from how we might describe a situation from a 3
rd
 person 
point of view to the 1
st
 person point of view of the agent. How the individual agent construes a 
particular situation is often described as an important part of virtue possession. Snow notes that 
as an agent “cultivates her virtue and it becomes second nature to her, her virtuous disposition 
will cause her to see or interpret the world in certain ways.”39 In evaluating an agent’s behavior, 
Russell argues that the standard of the behavior should we with respect to how the agent 
themselves construes or interprets the situation, and that there a virtuous perspective that one can 
work toward achieving.
40
 Some, like Kamtekar, even take differences in construal to be 
indicative of agents being in different situations, despite objective features generally being the 
same. This is similar to McDowell’s point about virtuous agents not even being in the same 
situation as most of us because of their particular kind of perception.
41
  
c. Deliberation 
 Rational deliberation and practical reasoning are also behaviors associated with virtue. 
The virtuous agent possesses a particular faculty of deliberation that assists in selection of right 
action.
42
 The deliberation can take on various forms, from calculating consequences, weighing 
competing duties, or even determining what obligations might be on the virtuous agent in the 
first place. Whatever the particulars of the process may be, the important point is that 
deliberation involves the section of a particular course of action among the available choices. 
Another way of putting is what actions produced by deliberation are more fully one’s own than 
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others.
43
 At one point, Aristotle himself describes virtue as “a state of character concerned with 
choice.”44 Elsewhere, Aristotle notes, “Virtues are expressions of our choice, or at any rate, 
imply choice.”45 In deliberation, one needs available options to choose from, the determination 
of which does not necessarily need to be involved with the deliberation itself. Dylan Murry, who 
advocates for deliberation being the sole trait-appropriate behavior for virtue, notes, “in order to 
choose one from among competing options, one must already be aware that there are options and 
of what they are.”46 Deliberation need not be conscious either, as unconscious choice is a well-
known phenomenon, and there is no good reason to disassociate it from virtue.  
d. Overt behavior 
Much of the situationist evidence draws on accounts of overt behavior from social 
psychology experiments. This has undoubtedly contributed to the misconception that 
situationists are only targeting non-rational, mechanistic views of character.
47
 The claim is that 
situationists expect the appropriate character trait to be relatively situation-insensitive, and 
should result in particular overt behavior regardless of the circumstances.
48
 The jump from 
situationists focusing on overt behavior to situationists only targeting mechanistic character 
traits, however, is much too quick. Whatever else a theory of virtue posits, overt behavior is 
certainly important, sometimes even necessary for the possession certain virtues in some cases.
49
 
To possess a character trait or virtue that never contributes to behavior would be an exceptionally 
odd account for of virtue ethics. Fortunately, there are numerous accounts of virtue ethics that do 
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cite the importance of regularity in overt behavior, even if it is sensitive to situational variation.
50
 
None of this is to the exclusion of other considerations of character, such as how an agent 
deliberates and decides, emotional states, or what she cares about or takes as reasons to act, and 
subjective construal of the particular situation.  
Of the potential trait-relevant behaviors I consider, overt behavior is the most discussed 
type in the character debate. Most of the psychological studies that situationists draw on concern 
observations of overt behavior on the part of experimental subjects. Overt behavior should be 
understood as actions taken by an agent that are recognizable to a 3
rd
 party observer. Nussbaum 
notes that virtue includes patterns of commitment and conduct.
51
 Adams also cites behavioral 
acts as important (though not exhaustive) of virtue: “If [virtues] are to have the excellence that 
qualifies them as virtues, they should not be impotent in the shaping of [overt] behavior … 
[virtues] should normally involve [overt] behavioral dispositions of some sort.”52 Russell 
specifically endorses global traits that, in part, produce consistent overt behaviors.
53
 Other 
examples abound in the literature as well.
54
 So it is no accident that situationist focus on overt 
behavior. And while virtue is undoubtedly not exhausted by dispositions to move in a certain 
way, defenders of virtue ethics clearly acknowledge its importance for virtue. 
e. Emotional Responses 
Acting from virtue is also described as feeling a particular way while engaging in overt 
behavior. For example, “A good friend does not merely promote the good of her friend: she 
appreciates her friends, respects, and even loves her friend. Caring as a virtue involves 
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receptivity, perhaps love in some sense.”55 Acting to help a friend in need, even if for no other 
reason than that they are in need, may not be correctly described as acting from virtue if it is 
done begrudgingly or with indifference. Similarly, if someone is generous, it not just that they do 
the generous things, but that they have generous feelings as well.
56
 Indeed, valuing the emotional 
aspect of virtue is crucial to understanding virtue more generally. Adams notes that, “If enduring 
personal qualities are morally important and valuable only for the value of actions to which they 
contribute, then a theory of virtues and vices can hardly be more than a pendant to the ethics of 
action.” 57 The emotional side to virtue is importantly connected to right action. Performing the 
same overt behavior as the virtuous agent, even when performing those actions for the same 
reasons as the virtuous agent, is insufficient for acting virtuously.
58
  
To sum up, I’ve identified five candidates for the trait-relevant behavior that are 
associated with virtue: perception, construal, deliberation, overt behavior, and emotional 
responses. Despite much of the character debate focusing on inconsistency of overt behavior, the 
situationist argument should be understood as targeting a wide variety of behavioral types. This 
is important if since virtue ethical accounts committed to global traits can vary with respect to 
which behaviors are most connected to the virtue. 
VIII. General Empirical Commitments of Virtue Ethics 
 While the preceding section identified some possible empirical commitments on the part 
of virtue ethics, in the form of what could count as trait-relevant behavior, there are broader 
commitments many virtue ethical theories have in common that are important for the character 
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debate. These general commitments underscore why virtue ethics is particularly subject powerful 
empirical criticism in the first place. 
a. Psychological realism 
One of the supposed advantages of the virtue ethical approach is that it provides a 
familiar psychological picture of human beings. Whatever the other merits of other approaches 
may be, the thought process of the diehard utilitarian or deontologist can seem rather alien to us. 
Someone that is moved by, for example, the demands of compassion rather than utility 
maximization or adherence to abstract principles is more understandable to the average person.
59
 
This point is underscored by proponents of virtue ethics being committed to psychological 
realism. Psychological realism is the view that moral theorizing be restricted to understandings 
of what human beings can realistically be expected to do or aspire to do.
60 61
 Some theories of 
virtue are further restricted to psychological processes that can be reasonably expected of people, 
contrasted with merely possible. Certainly, some understand virtue ethics as primarily evaluative 
talk, able to fulfill its role independently of the types of psychological structures that most people 
have, but this proverbial exception that proves the rule. Character and virtue are often described 
as deep and enduring features of the agent.
62
 More recent approaches to virtue, built in part on 
the foundation of recent psychological research, share this commitment as well.
63
 A failure of 
psychological realism in a virtue ethical theory, while not something on the level of a 
contradiction, breaks with a long-held view about character and virtue. Recall from chapter 1 the 
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importance of the development of virtue, and Aristotle’s understanding of virtuous character as a 
natural state of flourishing for human beings. 
b. Causal Power 
 Given the importance of acting from virtue in order to perform right action, character 
traits, or at the very least the virtues, are thought to have some level of causal power. Causal 
power, that is, in determining at least the agent’s trait-relevant behavior. If character traits or 
virtues were causally inert, it is difficult to see what relevance possession of certain traits or 
virtues would have for an agent’s behavior.  Again, a live option is that what the virtuous agent 
does and how they do it could be a purely evaluative standard for action which we can compare 
ourselves to. Hursthouse specifically rejects this kind of picture of virtue, as she maintains virtue 
has a kind of “anti-codifability”, specifically unsuitable as a purely evaluative standard of 
action.
64
 An examination of many prominent virtue ethical theories reveals at least some causal 
relevance for traits.
 65
 But situationists clearly expect more than a minimal causal role for traits. 
Doris claims that the expectation is that possession of a particular trait should result in trait-
relevant behavior in trait-relevant situations at a regularity that is “markedly above chance.”66 
Although casualty isn’t specifically cited, it is safe to assume that the actual possession of the 
trait should be somewhere in the causal chain that leads to an agent’s action.67  
IX. Concluding Thoughts 
In this chapter, I presented the general situationist argument, its targets, clarified 
misrepresentations on both sides of the character debate, and identified empirical commitments 
of various virtue ethical theories. The commitments mentioned here are not meant to be 
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exhaustive of all potential empirical commitments, though together they do constitute where 
much of the empirical analysis occurs in the character debate. What is hopefully clear at this 
point is that there are, in fact, empirical commitments of virtue ethical theories, both in a general 
sense and regarding what counts as trait-relevant behavior, which opens such theories up to the 
empirical criticism. While some defenders of virtue embrace an empirically informed 
approach,
68
 empirical commitments are not always stated clearly. Of course, on its own, 
empirical commitments do not secure any kind of victory for the situationist, as it must be shown 
(1) that inconsistency with respect to trait-relevant behavior does occur and (2) that such 
inconsistency is due to factors that should trouble the virtue ethicist. Now that these empirical 
commitments are in view, in the next chapter I consider a representative sample of data available 
to the situationist and argue that there is sufficient empirical evidence to support the general 
situationist argument against virtue ethics.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE DATA 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Situationists cite numerous experimental results in support of their general argument 
against virtue ethics. Recall premise (2) of the general situationist argument which states, 
“Systematic observation reveals pervasive behavioral inconsistency.” The behaviors of interest 
are the trait-relevant behaviors described in the virtue ethics literature. What counts as trait-
relevant behavior varies across different accounts of virtue ethics. As a result, the general 
situationist argument is at its strongest when “behavior” can be read in a variety of ways. 
Chapter 2 identified five often cited aspects of trait-relevant behavior for virtue ethics: 
perception, construal, deliberation, emotional response, and overt behavior. In this chapter, I 
survey a representative sample of empirical studies in support of premise (2) that demonstrate 
inconsistency across a range of potential trait-relevant behaviors. While overviews of 
experimental data cited by situationists are found throughout the character debate,
1
 my approach 
of categorizing the results according to which behaviors are shown to be inconsistent is novel 
and will help clarify why certain rebuttals to the situationist argument fail.   
The organization of the chapter is as follows. In Section II I identify exactly what kind of 
inconsistency is of interest, and the specific criteria I use to identify that inconsistency.  Section 
III provides specific examples of studies that show inconsistency across a range of potential trait-
relevant behaviors. I consider some general objections to the studies used in Section IV, and 
close in Section V with a general overview of the main results of this chapter. 
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II. Getting Consistent on Inconsistency 
The character debate focuses on the supposed inconsistency of trait-relevant behavior. 
Trait-appropriate behavior is consistent if trait-relevant behavior reliably manifests across a wide 
variety of trait-relevant situations. A failure of consistency is a failure of the trait-relevant 
behavior to manifest in those situations where it is called for, to a significant enough degree. For 
example, if Sara has the global trait of honesty, on separate occasions when Sara is in honesty-
relevant situations, we should expect Sara to manifest honesty-relevant behavior. More needs to 
be said, however, about what kinds of failures of consistency matter, as not just any lapses of 
behavior will do. If honest Sara is subsequently seen to take up theft, but we learn she is stealing 
in order to feed starving orphans, whatever this might say about her character, it doesn’t indicate 
she is being inconsistently honest by the situationist.   
The kind of behavioral inconsistency the situationist is interested in is one where across 
situations with features that call for the trait-relevant behavior, that differ only with respect to 
trait-irrelevant situational features, the trait-relevant behavior does not manifest. Keeping in 
mind, as was discussed in chapter 2, that the frequency of trait-relevant behavior manifesting, by 
situationist standards, is only “markedly above chance” – nothing like an expectation of 100% 
manifestation. Of course, more needs to be said about what exactly counts as a trait-irrelevant 
situational feature. 
 Call a situational feature trait-irrelevant if it is both minor and morally irrelevant with 
respect to whatever the trait-relevant behavior happens to be. For example, while one’s starving 
child is a morally relevant factor regarding whether or not one should steal, having sunglasses on 
seems obviously morally irrelevant to stealing. With respect to a factor being minor, consider a 
case were someone fails to act compassionately when it is clearly called for, but then you come 
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to learn that their spouse has recently passed away. That someone close has passed away doesn’t 
exactly seem like a reason not to act compassionately, but I think it’s understandable. To put it 
another way, if the situationist argument was based on observations of people failing to act 
consistently when going through periods of grief or depression, the evidence wouldn’t be very 
compelling.
2
 Another way of thinking about this point is that the kind of inconsistency 
situationists stress is shifts in trait-relevant behavior due to factors that are not defensible as a 
reason for action (morally irrelevant), nor even somewhat understandable as the cause of 
behavioral shift (minor). 
 Admittedly, I am relying a bit on intuition and personal judgment with respect to what 
counts as trait-irrelevant factors, which isn’t completely satisfying. The dissatisfaction, however, 
I think can be mitigated by the fact that people on both sides of the character debate cite the same 
studies, so there’s at least some agreement on, prima facie, which situational factors are of 
interest.  Additionally, for the studies that are cited, the factors which are cited as having a 
significant impact on trait-relevant behavior seem hardly controversial as qualifying as minor, 
morally irrelevant factors. Miller settles on calling the factors I mean to highlight as “surprising” 
factors that significantly impact our behavior or deliberative processes.
3
  As mentioned earlier, 
when certain situational factors are found to have a significant impact trait-relevant behavior, one 
can consider if such a factor would be acceptable to cite as the reason for that behavior. That 
most people are more courteous after being given a freshly baked cookie might not give us 
pause. But if courteousness is somehow tied to the color of the drapes, that seems a bit strange. 
Again, given the general acceptance of the pool of studies to be concerned about within the 
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character debate, I believe my somewhat loose understanding of trait-irrelevant factors is up to 
the task of identifying which studies are of interest to the character debate.  
III. Experimental Evidence 
 With a somewhat clearer picture of how to identify those studies relevant to the character 
debate, I now shift focus to demonstrating how inconsistency can be found in the various types 
of trait-relevant behavior. I do want to flag that I do not claim to hold a privileged interpretation 
of the studies discussed here. Different interpretations are certainly available, and new 
experimental work may affirm or undermine any of the studies I highlight. Experimental results 
can, and certainly should be, questioned. That being said, I take the studies here at face value, 
and leave criticism of experimental design and data analysis with respect to best practices in 
psychology to the experts. The general situationist argument clearly depends on empirical data, 
and if the data can be shown to be illegitimate, then of course the situationist argument would be 
undermined. But lacking specific arguments to the contrary, I think it’s fair to trust the results of 
empirical research that has been vetted by a particular discipline’s standard practices until there 
is sufficient evidence to think otherwise. 
Following the identification of potential trait-relevant behavior from chapter 2, I divide 
the discussion of the experimental data based on which particular trait-relevant behavior has 
been shown to have troubling inconsistency. The categories of trait-relevant behavior, of course, 
aren’t meant to cut psychology and behavior at its joints. Additionally, my division of trait-
relevant behaviors is also not intended to represent a functional order of data input, deliberation, 
and overt behavioral output. That is, construing a particular situation does not always need to 
occur prior to deliberation. Some form of learning can occur during deliberation and perhaps 
awareness of additional factors that had previously gone unnoticed, which in turn might reorient 
 49 
 
deliberation. The exact order of events does not actually matter for my purposes. It’s important 
to keep in mind that, while most of the studies report significant changes in overt behavior, I 
think reasonable inferences can be made with respect to which trait-relevant behavior was 
impacted by the trait-relevant factor. Interpretation is aided by the background information 
presented along with the experimental results. 
a. Perception 
Perception is the awareness (both conscious and unconscious) of situational features 
facing the individual. This includes brute sensory awareness, but can further include things like 
empathic awareness of the emotional state of others. 
Much of the relevant experimental evidence for perception involves the study of 
attention. Studies have shown that positive or negative mood can have a significant effect on 
how much we attend to the world around us. Sedikides (1992) indicates that good mood 
broadens our attention, while bad moods narrow it. This has been interpreted as explaining some 
studies regarding helping behavior, such as pleasing smells (e.g., fresh bread or coffee) having a 
significant effect on helping behavior. In Baron (1997) subjects were more likely to alert and 
help someone who had various items falling out of a bag they were carrying when around 
pleasing smells. Reducing the level of neutral stimuli increased helpfulness on a general level 
(Korte et al. 1975:1000-1). That mood can significantly impact any behavior may not be much of 
a surprise. It’s best not to ask someone for a favor after they’ve had a bad night at the poker 
table. What is important though is how minor the factors are that impact our mood enough to 
make difference. Smells in the air or noise levels are sufficient to significantly change levels of 
helpfulness. Smells (excepting certain extremes) also seem morally irrelevant to helpfulness.  
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One of the most often cited experiments in the character debate is the Darley and Batson 
(1973) ‘Good Samaritan’ study. The design of the experiment consisted in seminary students 
tasked with delivering a sermon on the famous ‘Good Samaritan’ parable, which highlights the 
importance of helping strangers in need. After being assigned to give the lecture in a location far 
across Princeton’s campus, the students were either told they had plenty of time to get there, or 
were running late already. A confederate was placed on the path toward the lecture location that 
appeared in to be great distress. The results of the experiment are summarized in the table below. 
Table 1: Good Samaritan Study Results 
 Low Degree of Hurry Medium Degree of 
Hurry 
High Degree of Hurry 
Percentage of subjects 
rendering aid 
63% 45% 10% 
 
There are multiple explanations for these results, some of which claim the anxiety of 
being late for the lecture narrowed some students’ attention such that they didn’t notice the 
person in need. This is only one explanation of course, and an alternate interpretation will be 
discussed in later sections. Assuming it’s a case of narrowed attention where the subjects didn’t 
notice the confederate, that something as simple as running later might impact our ability to 
perceiving someone in distress can be alarming.  
b. Construal 
 I turn now to studies relevant for construal. Recall that construal involves the agent’s 
interpretation and understanding of a particular situation. For these studies, it is not a matter of 
the expansion or narrowing of attention such that certain features are either missed or become 
more salient. Many defenders of virtue ethics discuss experimental subjects’ construal as a way 
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of explaining away potentially problematic results.
4
 How effective such responses are is reserved 
for chapter 4.  
Automaticity research purports to show that much of our decision making, including 
moral decision making, is the result of several processes we are unaware of and that function 
below the level of conscious awareness. One example of the effect of automatic processing is 
unconscious goal activation. As Snow describes it, “when an individual encounters the relevant 
situational features, the representation of the associated goal is directly but nonconsciously 
activated.”5 Such representations, for example, can significantly impact construing other people 
as neutral bystanders or potential rivals.
6
  
Many studies associated with automaticity involve priming subjects with words or 
images, and then checking if that priming has a detectable overt behavioral impact. Consider one 
of the most famous (and controversial) examples. I describe it here only to clarify the research 
program. Exposing subjects to multiple words normally associated with the elderly (e.g., 
retirement, Florida) in something like a word search task seemed to cause subjects to walk more 
slowly when leaving the lab than those exposed to neutral words.
7
 This study in particular has 
been disputed,
8
 though there have been some published replications.
9
 Whatever the ultimate fate 
of this study is, walking speed doesn’t obviously seem relevant for character discussions. There 
are, however, replicated priming studies which appear to impact morally relevant construal 
behaviors.  
                                                          
4
 E.g., Kamtekar (2004), Snow (2010), Russell (2009). 
5
 Snow (2010:43). 
6
 The automaticity research project has come under controversy, with failures to replicate certain popular studies. 
Despite this, there are several prominent studies that have been replicated by multiple labs to safely include them 
into the discussion. 
7
 Bargh et al. (1996). 
8
 Doyen et al. (2012). 
9
 Hull et al. (2002) and Cesario et al. (2006). 
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Racial stereotype priming has been linked to increased aggression.
10
 A meta-analysis of 
multiple priming effects on impression formation supports a range of studies stretching back to 
the 1980s.
11
 As the name implies, impression formation is linked to our initial judgments of 
people and can significantly impact how we treat them in social situations. For example, subjects 
primed by either words indicating a power differential or activation of career goals, can lead to 
increased dismissiveness or disrespect.
12
 Priming done with movies with revenge themes 
increased subjects’ punishment of a competitor in a game.13 Evidence from automaticity research 
clearly shows how construal can be significantly impacted due to minor and, I submit, morally 
irrelevant changes in situation.  
One general way of understanding the impact of many of the studies which appear to 
have their impact on construal is that the situational factors limit the perceived options for the 
subjects before they even begin to deliberate. The general idea is that particular situational 
factors cause the subject to not see particular options as an “option for me”.14 Options that might 
seem obvious to a third party observer may not even occur as live options for someone in the 
“heat of the moment”. Whatever the impact of disruptions of construal may be, they are subject 
to trait-irrelevant factors.  
c. Deliberation 
The deliberative process includes choosing course of action, given the particular options 
that appear to be open to the agent. The influence of minor, morally irrelevant situational factors 
should demonstrate inconsistency in the process of the subject making a choice among different 
options (or perhaps even selecting the only choice available). By way of illustration, consider the 
                                                          
10
 Wheeler and Petty (2001) and Wheeler and DeMarree (2009). 
11
 DeCoster and Claypool (2004). 
12
 Chartrand and Bargh (1996). 
13
 Green and Stonner (1973). 
14
 Murray (2014:717-718). 
 53 
 
following toy example. Suppose you’re in a room with a few other people, and suddenly you 
hear a loud crash and a scream of pain from the next room. Among the possible courses of 
action, you think you can get up to check out the disturbance, sit quietly and do nothing, or 
encourage someone else to check it out. Choosing among these three options is how I am 
defining the deliberative process. All of the options must be perceived, for the subject, as an 
“option for me” (as discussed in the previous section). There might have been options you could 
take in the room when you hear the crash but that never reached the level of deliberation. For 
example, there may have been a telephone or intercom in the room that, for whatever reason, 
went unnoticed. That you fail to use (or even consider) the telephone is not a failure of 
deliberation.  
The above example resembles studies conducted on the effects of crowds of varying size 
on individuals’ willingness to render aid. In one study, subjects were put into a situation very 
much like that described above, where a loud crash was heard in a neighboring room. Subjects 
who were alone in the original room when they heard the crash were much more likely to get up 
and investigate than those who were in the room with other people. The same kinds of effects 
have been readily documented in large crowds outside of the laboratory as well, sometimes 
dubbed the “group effect”.15 There are multiple theories as to why this occurs, from the idea that 
large crowds diffuse responsibility, or even an attempt to avoid embarrassment of being the only 
person to offer assistance when none might be needed.
16
 Whatever the primary motivator may 
actually be, I characterize such effects as occurring during the deliberative state, since it hardly 
seems plausible that, barring exceptional circumstances, even the possibility of rendering 
assistance (or even just investigating someone’s cry for help) didn’t occur to the agent. Certainly 
                                                          
15
 For a review of various group effect studies, see Miller (2014:142-146). 
16
 For an extensive review of the group effect literature, see Miller (2013: 143-145).  
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there are likely to be cases where crowds are so large that people fail to notice someone in need, 
as described by Ross and Nisbett (1991:43). This, however, does not explain all of the different 
iterations of group effect studies, and thus at least some group effect studies demonstrate 
inconsistency in deliberation.
17
   
A less dramatic case involves light levels and cheating behavior.
18
 Researchers found that 
slightly lower light levels in a room (not enough to significantly interfere with vision) increased 
cheating behavior. Subjects completed a series of mathematics puzzles and were allowed to score 
their own work. Each correct answer earned the subject a cash reward. Inaccurate scoring in 
favor of earning more money was significantly higher in the room with lower light levels. 
Cheating was similarly increased for subjects wearing sunglasses. In contrast to cheating 
behavior, charitable giving and volunteering one’s time also have a surprising connection to 
subtle situational factors. Another study found subjects in cleanly scented rooms gave 
significantly more money to charity than those in neutral smelling rooms.
19
 As with the 
previously discussed studies, it’s hard to imagine that subjects in these studies didn’t realize that 
not cheating or not giving to charity was an “option for them”. Another result from the 
automaticity research is that the environment one casts their vote significantly impact the types 
of social policies one supports. Voting in a school, as opposed to a neutral location like a post 
office or town hall building, increases the likelihood that people support a sales tax increase for 
education funding.
20
 Given the presence of a ballot, the available choices are quire explicit, and 
not something that could easily be missed via perception or construal. 
                                                          
17
 In particular see Latané and Darley (1970), Latané et al. (1981), and Karakashian et al. (2006) for discussion of 
subjects noticing the person in need, and recognized the possibility that they could render assistance, but chose not 
to. 
18
 Zhong et al. (2010). 
19
 Liljenquist et al. (2010). 
20
 Originally published in Bargh et al (1996), replicated by Dijksterhuis & Bargh (2001), Wheeler & Petty (2001) 
and Wheeler & DeMarree (2009). 
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Consider a further variation on the Good Samaritan study, discussed in some detail in 
Snow (2010: 103-107). Besides the previous experimental conditions of being told whether or 
not they needed to hurry to the location, participants were also informed as to how important 
their lecture was. The results are summarized below. 
Table 2: Good Samaritan Study Variation Results 
 Low 
Importance & 
No Hurry 
Low 
Importance & 
Hurry 
High 
Importance & 
No Hurry 
High 
Importance & 
Hurry 
Percentage of subjects 
rendering aid 
80% 70% 50% 10% 
 
These results indicate further considerations on the part of the participants. When they 
thought there wasn’t a great many people depending on them, more of them stopped to help the 
confederate, even when they were running late. One way to interpret this is that it was not simply 
a matter of participants being in the rush and not noticing the confederate, but rather that some 
weighing, either conscious or unconscious, of responsibilities took place. If they were running 
late and thought their lecture was important, they passed by the confederate. Otherwise, helping 
someone clearly in need trumped anything about a lecture. One thought is that this mitigates the 
worry about the Good Samaritan case since all that really occurred was a weighing of 
responsibilities, rather than any peculiar situational influence.
21
 
Feelings of guilt and embarrassment also result in changes to deliberation. Subjects 
induced to feel guilt were more likely to help strangers with things like alerting them to leaving 
their belongings somewhere, or to help pick up dropped materials.
22
 Numerous studies on guilt 
and embarrassment seem to indicate that such feelings motivate helpfulness and courtesy 
because the subject wants to make up for a wrong they perceive themselves to have done (in the 
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 Batson et al. (1978:100). 
22
 Regan et al. (1972) and Konečni (1972). 
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case of guilt) or to repair a damaged image, raise self-esteem, or just alleviate the bad feelings (in 
the case of embarrassment).
23
 In a similar vein, subjects in a generally positive mood are more 
likely to be helpful in an attempt to maintain that particular mood.
24
 
The studies in the preceding paragraph may seem like an odd inclusion into the mix, as it 
may not be all that surprising feelings of guilt or embarrassment lead to people trying to make-up 
for perceived wrongdoing or repairing their self-image. One reason to consider studies such as 
these is the relative ease in which guilt and embarrassment can be induced in people through 
very minor, morally irrelevant situational changes. For example, simply asking people for a 
small favor soon after their leave a bathroom was sufficient induce embarrassment help such that 
they were more helpful.
25
 Producing enough guilt in someone is as easy as simply telling them 
they have done something to cause an expensive camera to malfunction, or even priming them 
with guilt-related adjectives.
26
  
d. Overt Behavior 
Minor, morally irrelevant situational influence on overt behavior occurs when a subject 
has decided on some course of action during the deliberative stage, but somehow fails to follow-
through with that decision. The failure here, of course, should come from the subject themselves, 
and not some external force like being physically restrained from acting. Such a situation is 
sometimes described in discussions of virtue and character as akractic behavior or weakness of 
will. However such interference ends up being described, it is helpful to note exactly which 
studies point to overt behavioral inconsistency.  
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 For an extensive review of guilt and embarrassment studies, see Miller 2013 (33-63). 
24
 Miller (2013:72). 
25
 Miller (2013:57ff). 
26
 Regan et al. (1972) and Zhong and Liljenquist (2006). As those like Miller (2013: 34n19) have pointed out, these 
inducements of guilt are rather minor, and should not be confused with feeling of chronic guilt suffered by some, 
which is not thought to enhance helping behavior (see Quiles and Bybee: 1997). Chronic guilt is not a condition the 
aforementioned studies have attempted in induce in subjects. 
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Stanley Milgram’s obedience study is one of the most cited studies in debates about 
character and virtue.
 27
 The published conclusions reveal that everyday people can be driven to 
administer seemingly dangerous electric shocks to an innocent person under the command of a 
stern scientist. Milgram observed that “Subjects have learned from childhood that it is a 
fundamental breach of moral conduct to hurt another person against his will. Yet, 26 subjects 
abandon this tenet in following the instructions of an authority who has no special powers to 
enforce his commands.”28 The 26 referenced here (2/3 of the total number of participants) are 
those who continued to shock the victim even after the victim protested and became 
unresponsive. 
While some test subjects were described as tense, nervous, and some even protesting, 
they continued to obey. These regular people seemingly abandoned, ignored, or were simply 
unaffected by traits of common decency because of the circumstances of the situation. Given the 
description of the study, it seems difficult to claim that there were not obvious features to the 
situation available to give participants sufficient reasons or motivations to act otherwise than 
they did. Subjects heard clear protests or screams of the victim and the machine they were using 
to administer the shocks was clearly labeled with numerous warnings. Merely focusing on the 
most well-known experimental results, as is sometimes done in the character debate, misses what 
I think it the real importance of the Milgram experiment for the character debate. While the 
urgings of the scientist might seem to be a minor situational factor, I think I case could be made 
for it not being a morally irrelevant factor. Orders from an authority figure, especially from a 
scientist in the context of an experiment, likely carry some legitimacy. Variations on the original 
experimental conditions, however, provide an interesting perspective. While the physical 
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 Milgram (1963; 371 – 378). 
28
 Ibid., 376. 
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presences of the authority figure ordering the electric shocks resulted in high levels of obedience, 
putting the authority figure on the phone resulted in plummeting obedience rates.
29
 Having the 
victim in the same room as the subject also lowered obedience levels, especially when subjects 
had to make physical contact with the victim to administer the shock. The numerous accounts of 
subjects protesting against continuing indicate a decision to stop participation, but they then 
failed to follow through with such a decision because of the experimental conditions.
30
 The Good 
Samaritan study might be best understood in the same light with subjects wanting to help, even 
deciding to, bow to the demands of punctuality and continue on their way to give a lecture.
31
 The 
same could also be said for the numerous group effect studies, where subjects felt a strong desire 
to help, decided they should do something, but were then overwhelmed by wanting to avoid 
something like embarrassment.
32
 
As with the previous categories, different interpretations of these studies are possible, and 
this is especially true in the case of evaluating overt behavior. But since overt behavior is often 
downstream of perception, construal, and deliberation, overt behavior is plausibly the most 
impacted by minor, morally irrelevant situational factors, albeit sometimes indirectly.  
 In the preceding sections, I’ve identified a sampling of experimental data that 
demonstrates minor, morally irrelevant situational conditions having a significant impact on the 
given trait-relevant behavior. This impact is what supports the situationist claim of pervasive 
behavioral inconsistency. Recall, however, that the discussion in chapter 2 also cited emotional 
responses as trait-relevant behavior, and none of the studies I’ve mentioned have discussed 
inconsistency with respect to a subject’s emotional response. The main reason is that there is 
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 Milgram (1974:59-62). 
30
 This interpretation is offered by Swanton (2003:31). Bok (1996) explains the results of the Milgram experiment 
being due to perceived conflicts of duty leading to indecision. 
31
 Doris (2002) offers a possible interpretation along these lines. 
32
 See Bandura (1996) for additional interpretations of studies like the Milgram experiment. 
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simply a lack of empirical study that specifically focuses on emotional responses in a way that’s 
relevant to the character debate. Indeed, in the case of the Milgram experiment, despite 
continuing to administer “dangerous” electric shocks, emotional distress on the part of the 
subjects seemed to be appropriate to the circumstances. Measuring specifically emotional 
responses, while certainly not impossible, has its own set of empirical challenges. Despite the 
lack of experimental evidence, the situationist argument has not been specifically targeted 
against emotional responses, so I don’t think the lack of data is this area need trouble the 
situationist. While in principle one might think they could build a virtue ethical theory around 
purely emotional responses in an attempt to avoid situationist criticism, the normative value of 
such a theory seems suspect. The issue of the normative adequacy of a moral theory is discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter.  
IV. Objections to the Empirical Data 
Rather than offering alternative interpretations of the experimental data, another response 
to situationist arguments is to reject that the data undermines virtue ethics in the first place. This 
type of response is articulated in a few distinct ways. In this part of the discussion, I’ll address 
the most promising arguments against the type of data cited by situationists. 
a. Lack of Longitudinal Studies 
With only a few exceptions, data cited by situationists are based one-off studies, rather 
than longitudinal studies. A study is longitudinal when it involves repeated observations of the 
same variables over long periods of time, such as observing the same person over time. One of 
the main reasons such studies are rare in social psychology is the high cost and difficult logistics 
of maintaining long term observations of the same individual. Furthermore, the level of control 
experimenters have outside of a laboratory environment is considerably lower, making data 
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analysis much more difficult for “free range” test subjects. It should be noted, however, that the 
difficulty of longitudinal studies alone does not justify using results from one-off studies to 
support strong situationist conclusions. Fortunately for the situationist, there are independent 
reasons for thinking the results from one-off studies are more than up for the task to support 
general situationist argument. 
 To understand this objection to the experimental evidence, it is important to understand 
why it might seem that longitudinal studies are necessary to draw conclusions about people’s 
character. Recall two of the tenants of globalism identified by Doris, consistency and stability. 
Consistency requires that trait-relevant behavior reliably manifests across a wide variety of trait-
relevant situations. Stability requires that trait-relevant behavior manifests over time in the same 
way in similar trait-relevant situations. If a particular study only includes behavioral observations 
of an individual in a single condition, it’s natural to ask what this could possible say about 
someone’s behavior in a wide variety of situations over long periods of time. Some authors make 
just this sort of point in their rejection of much of the data referenced by situationists.
33
 
 One quick response to such a complaint is that, for at least some character traits, a single 
event observation is sufficient to undermine particular trait attributions. Someone that cheats on 
their spouse even just one time would justifiably be said to lack the trait of faithfulness. So-
called “high-fidelity” traits do not require multiple observations to gather strong evidence against 
someone lacking such a trait.
34
 Other claims by situationists cite the incredible wealth of 
experimental data supporting the claim that subtle situational factors strongly influence trait-
relevant behavior reduces the need for any single study to be so large in scope.
35
 However, such 
responses do not fully address the complaint about there being too few longitudinal studies. For 
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 See Sreenivasn (2008:607) and Kupperman (1991: 162-163). 
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 Alfano (2013: 72-73).  
35
 Doris (2002:38). 
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one, merely claiming that one study is enough to undermine certain high-fidelity virtues 
significantly narrows the scope of the situationist argument. Indeed, it almost seems like an 
argument for the rarity of high-fidelity traits, like virtues of faithfulness or chastity, something I 
expect most defenders of virtues ethics would not deny. If complaints about a lack of 
longitudinal studies can undermine just a few of the more prominent studies cited by 
situationists, like Milgram, defenders of virtue ethics will have made significant progress in 
reducing the threat of the empirical evidence. 
 The worry about a lack of longitudinal studies can be addressed in a more favorable way 
for the situationist.  Recall that the complaint about the lack of longitudinal studies is that we 
supposedly cannot draw conclusions about someone’s character from a one-off case.36 A single 
observation of behavior in a single setting does not reveal what someone will do if they run into 
the same circumstances at some point later in time or find themselves in some variation of the 
circumstances. It is important to unpack what some of the implications of this complaint. At the 
very least, it’s meant to imply that a single failure to act in a way consistent with trait-relevant 
behavior in trait-relevant situations is not sufficient evidence to claim that person does not 
possess a particular global character trait or maybe even virtue. This seems right, someone could 
possess the trait of generosity or charitableness without donating time or money to every single 
organization or individual that legitimately requests it. A similar response has been made 
towards the results of the Milgram experiment.
37
 The failure to act with compassion in this one-
off case is not sufficient evidence to claim that any one participant lacked compassion. 
 Set aside for the moment the thought that perhaps shocking someone to the point of them 
being non-responsive might be reason to think someone lacks compassion, even if they only do it 
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once. I take it that advancing an objection against non-longitudinal studies might claim that 
something like a failure to act compassionately in a Milgram-style setting would not invalidate 
all the other times a person has acted compassionately. It seems appropriate to still attribute a 
trait of compassion to someone, even if they do have the occasional “off-day” or failure to act 
compassionately. A situationist might want to quibble further with this point, but I think a better 
response is to accept these claims without complaint and then show how it still fails to address 
the force of the situationist evidence.  
The situationist argument against the widespread possession of global character traits is 
not some kind of inductive argument starting with various individuals failing to possess global 
character traits. As discussed earlier, situationists readily admit that direct evidence for or against 
a particular person’s possession of one kind of character trait or another would require long term, 
systematic observation of that individual.
38
 Instead, with regard to interpreting experimental 
results to support their argument, situationists are best thought of as appealing to inference to the 
best explanation. Having an “off-day” for being compassionate could make sense when 
considering a single person. However, to claim that the results of so many of the studies cited by 
situationists are better explained by all these participants having their “compassion off-day”, 
rather than the experimental conditions, strains credulity. This is especially true in the case of the 
Milgram experiment, given the numerous replications of the study, which have resulted in very 
similar findings.
39
 Situationist claims about a lack of global character traits are not meant to 
apply to any single person from a given study, but are instead meant to explain so many of the 
experimental findings in the literature. 
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An analogy may be helpful in clarifying this point. Assume a pharmaceutical trial showed 
overall that the subjects given the experimental drug had a significantly larger improvement in 
health than the control group. This doesn’t show than any individual subject in the experimental 
condition had their health improved by the drug. But it is evidence that, overall, health is 
improved by the experimental drug. So while non-longitudinal studies do not allow one to draw 
conclusions about individuals, the results can support observations about population norms. And 
this is just what the situationist needs to support something like (2) in the general situationist 
argument. 
b. Studies fail to test morally relevant behavior 
 Situationists appear to have a great body of experimental evidence to draw from in 
support of their arguments. However, some accuse situationists of citing studies that fail to test 
morally relevant behavior.
40
 The complaint here is that far too many of the studies test behavior 
in situations having to do with courtesy, politeness, or low-stakes situations. If this argument 
goes through, of course, it would not remove all of the empirical support for the situationist 
argument. Studies such as the Milgram experiment clearly test morally relevant behavior. But if 
the defender of virtue ethics can drastically reduce the scope of the experimental evidence 
brought against their view, a piecemeal response to individual studies becomes a promising 
strategy. This is especially true in my case where empirical evidence is spread across categories 
of trait-relevant behavior.  
 One famous study targeted by this reply, and that has also seen a lot of mileage in the 
character debate, is one where the presence or absence of a dime in the coin return in a phone 
booth was found to be the best predictor of someone stopping to help pick up some dropped 
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papers.
41
 This is clearly a far cry from testing someone’s willingness to administer electric. So 
the objection goes, a failure to act in these minimally demanding situations says little about 
someone’s character, let alone virtue. While such results may be interesting to social psychology, 
the results should have little bearing on discussions virtue ethics. 
Reasonable people can disagree about the relevance of these studies. While I may not be 
a moral monster for not stopping to pick up some dropped papers, it doesn’t seem mistaken to 
think that we often judge people on how they handle themselves in such situations. But rather 
than push for the importance of courtesy, there is a more promising response that can be made by 
the situationist. Accepting the argument that studies which measure low-stakes behavior have 
little bearing on certain character evaluations doesn’t actually help a defender of virtue ethics all 
that much. Instead, it puts the defender of virtue ethics in an awkward position of claiming such 
studies measure trait-irrelevant behavior. This seems to force defenders of virtue ethics to be 
committed to the following: while situations involving matters of significant moral weight are 
often guided by character, small acts of courtesy and kindness are largely at the mercy of 
situational influences. The implication is that most of our everyday interactions with others are 
subject the inconsistency situationists argue for, since most people don’t find themselves in 
situations of heavy moral importance that often. While such a view might be compatible with 
globalist versions of virtue ethics, it seems unlikely a defender of virtue ethics would wish to 
concede so much of our everyday life to situationist interpretation. Indeed, this seems to concede 
the point that much of our everyday behavior isn’t ordered by global traits, which is hardly a 
defense against the general situationist argument. 
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V. Closing Thoughts 
This chapter has presented a representative sample of empirical studies which 
demonstrate minor, morally irrelevant situational factors having a significant impact on a range 
of trait-relevant behaviors. Some responses to situationist arguments have attempted to focus on 
alternatives to overt behavior as the trait-relevant behavior most important to virtue ethics.
42
 
With the exception of emotional responses, the inconsistency applies to the full range of 
potential trait-relevant behaviors. So whatever it is a defender of virtue ethics claims the primary 
trait-relevant behavior to be, there is likely a serious empirical threat to be considered. In 
essence, the behavioral inconsistency pointed out by situationists can’t be swept under the rug. 
There are, of course, other ways for defenders of virtue ethics to respond to the empirical 
data. One of the more recent responses is to claim that data cited by situationist doesn’t actually 
demonstrate inconsistency, once situations are categorized by psychological features salient to 
the agent, rather than the objective features observable from a 3
rd
 person perspective. This 
response will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
RESPONSES TO SITUATIONISM 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
As should be clear at this point, virtue ethics refers to a broad category of ethical theories, 
with much more complex theoretical commitments than merely the development of a virtuous 
character. Additionally, situationist arguments against virtue ethics target a wide variety of 
theoretical claims. Despite this, it’s fair to say that the situationists’ main line of criticism is 
primarily fueled by empirical observations of behavioral inconsistency. Following the familiar 
structure of philosophical debate, much turns on what is meant by key terms. Within the 
character debate, disagreement abounds over what exactly is meant by consistency. In this 
chapter, I argue that many who answer situationist charges of inconsistency by redefining 
consistency do so to the detriment of their own theory.
1
  Definitions of consistency on offer, 
exemplified by the work of Snow, Russell, and Miller, argue for a revisionary kind of 
consistency as sufficient for character and virtue. There are serious problems with these accounts 
of consistency, however, since in each case there is a failure of normative or empirical adequacy 
for the resulting theory. While such failures by no means falsify the theory, it should raise doubt 
as to their suitability for addressing situationist arguments. 
 In section II, I provide my criteria for assessing normative and empirical 
adequacy. Section III presents a more detailed and general account of consistency that is neutral 
with respect to the character debate. This general account provides a framework by which to 
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Another response to the charges of inconsistency is to assert that the virtue ethics tradition is not committed to 
consistent traits (e.g., Hurka 2006). A theory of virtue that denies any commitment to consistency is obviously not 
troubled by situationist worries of inconsistency. But given the common commitments of virtue ethics discussed in 
chapter 2, such a view is in a minority. My arguments in this chapter are only directed at defenders of virtue ethics 
who take some form of consistency as crucial to their theory. 
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better evaluate the work of Snow, Russell, and Miller on consistency. Section IV identifies the 
general structure of the accounts by Snow, Russell and Miller. In section V, I describe the 
empirical model of traits endorsed by Snow and Russell, and then show in section VI why that 
model fails to be normatively adequate. Section VII describes Miller’s mixed-trait account, while 
section VIII argues why Miller’s account fails standards of empirical adequacy. I conclude in 
section IX by summarizing my findings and reasons that the situationist challenge has yet to be 
answered. With the situationist challenge unanswered, new directions for virtue ethics are 
needed. 
II. Normative and Empirical Adequacy 
 Throughout this chapter, I will argue that recent replies to situationist charges of 
inconsistency fail standards of normative or empirical adequacy. In this section, I outline my 
criteria for evaluating normative and empirical adequacy.  
a. Normative Adequacy 
A full accounting of a normative adequacy would require its own independent 
investigation, so it is not my intention to provide a complete picture here. Instead, I identify only 
a necessary condition for a moral theory to be normatively adequate. Failure to meet this modest 
condition is sufficient to support my charge of certain accounts of consistency failing to be 
normatively adequate for virtue ethics.  
 Normative theories describe what ought to be the case or what we ought to strive 
for. This can include how we ought to act or what we ought to value. As discussed in chapter 1, 
virtue ethics is concerned with traits of character or virtues that we ought to develop in order to 
secure right action and personal flourishing as human beings. Recall that, for Aristotle, the 
normative force of the particular virtues he identifies is derived from a supposed natural 
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teleology of human beings as rational beings. Virtue ethics is, of course, not tied to Aristotle’s 
original conception, and some contemporary virtue ethicists derive normative force from other 
potential sources, such as physiological health. Besser-Jones’ account, for instance, uses a 
particular conception of psychological well-being for identifying virtues, while Snow focus on 
social intelligence. But overall, as I’ve discussed, common threads are found throughout many 
virtue ethical accounts which focus on facilitating right action and personal flourishing. 
 For a component of a theory to be normatively adequate it should at least support 
the normative ends of the theory itself.
2
 For example, consider a utilitarian moral theory based 
around maximizing human happiness. Suppose this utilitarian theory included a specific 
algorithm for determining whether or not a particular action should be performed. If it turned out 
that this algorithm frequently recommended actions that miserably failed at maximizing human 
happiness, such an algorithm would fail to be a normatively adequate component of the 
utilitarian theory. I will argue that revisionary accounts of consistency offered by Snow and 
Russell fail to be normatively adequate for virtue ethics in a similar way. Snow and Russell’s 
account of consistency, with respect to virtue ethics, can too easily fail facilitate right action, and 
may actively count against personal flourishing. 
b. Empirical Adequacy 
 Empirical adequacy has a long history in the philosophy of science. Even when 
empirically informed, moral theories are held to different standards than scientific theories. Some 
accounts of consistency relevant for virtue ethics, however, are constructed in order to 
accommodate empirical observations. As a result, at least some standards of scientific theories, 
seem appropriate. Importantly, I am only interested in rather minimal standards of empirical 
adequacy. For the discussion of consistency, I am interested in what was first articulated by van 
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 Sumner (1996). 
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Fraassen, that an empirically adequate theory “saves the phenomena.”3 As I go on to argue in 
Section VII, the account of consistency offered by Miller, coupled with his understanding of a 
widely instantiated global character traits, fails to accommodate the phenomena that people can 
and do act inconsistently, or “out of character”. While Miller is not arguing for an account of 
virtue ethics, he does resist situationist claims regarding pervasive behavioral inconsistency. But 
in making even behavioral inconsistency effectively impossible, Miller’s response to situationists 
fails to be empirically adequate.  
III. A Positive Account of Consistency 
Much of this chapter is occupied with showing how various defenders of virtue ethics 
have failed in one way or another to present an adequate definition of consistency. In this 
section, I present a very general definition of consistency that empirically minded theories of 
virtue ethics should be committed to. Additionally, in order to be consistent with the literature, I 
refer to individual traits being consistent, rather than persons being consistent. In this chapter, as 
with the previous chapters, the concept of trait-relevant behavior should be read as exceptionally 
broad, standing in for one or more of the trait-relevant behaviors discussed in Chapter 2. The 
potential trait-relevant behaviors are perception, construal, deliberation, overt behavior, and 
emotional responses. Consider the following definition:
4
  
Consistency: A trait is consistent if appropriate trait-relevant behavior manifests with 
regularity significantly above chance for each Response Individuating Feature for multiple 
situations that differ only with respect to Criterial Features. 
Criterial Features determine which character trait is under consideration. Additionally, if 
the Criterial Feature were not present, there would insufficient information for character 
                                                          
3
 van Fraassen (1980:12). 
4
 For additional discussion of this definition of consistency and others, see Webber (2006), Sreenivasan (2002; 
2008) and Alfano (2013). 
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evaluation. For example, determining if an agent has compassion would require compassion-
relevant behaviors across multiple situations where there is an appropriate opportunity for 
compassion-relevant behavior. Criterial Features should also be unified in some way such that, 
as a set, they are all related to the same trait under consideration. This is not to say that the same 
Criterial Features could not be used for multiple character evaluations. Whatever might be 
providing the opportunity for courage-relevant behavior may also be providing an opportunity 
for honest-relevant behavior (e.g., testifying against a mob boss in a criminal trial is indicative of 
both honesty and courage).  Criterial Features should not be a collection of disparate conditions 
for which consistent responses would be uninformative for potential trait attribution.  
Appropriate trait-relevant behavior is behavior in-line with the trait under consideration 
determined by the Criterial Features. For example, if the Criterial Features are unified with 
respect to opportunities for courageous behavior, the appropriate trait-relevant behavior is 
behavior considered courageous. So for a consistent trait of courage, the courage-relevant 
behavior should manifest with regularity significantly above chance for each Response 
Individuating Feature for each Criterial Feature.   
Response Individuating Features are the factors that individuate the range of the agent’s 
behavioral responses (again, with a very broad reading of behavior). Unlike Criterial Features, 
there is no counterfactual dependence on the presence of particular Response Individuating 
Features for the appropriateness of a particular character evaluation. Recall that for an evaluation 
of compassion, potential Criterial Features are restricted to instances where, for example, there 
is someone in need of help or comfort. There are no such restrictions for Response Individuating 
Features. Response Individuating Features should, however, detail as much as possible the full 
range of the agent opportunities for trait-relevant responses to the Criterial Features. 
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To help understand this definition of consistency, consider the following “counterfactual 
reaction profile” in Table 3. For each counterfactual reaction profile, it can be assumed that each 
trait-relevant response is occurring with regularity significantly above chance. The trait depicted 
below results in consistent by Consistency.
5
  
Table 3: General Counterfactual Reaction Profile
6
 
 Criterial Feature (1) Criterial Feature (2) Criterial Feature (3) 
Response 
Individuating Feature 
(1) 
 
Trait-relevant response (1) 
Response 
Individuating Feature 
(2) 
 
 
 
Trait-relevant response (2)  
Response 
Individuating Feature 
(3) 
 
Tables 4-6 depict potential counterfactual reaction profiles for compassion. For the sake 
of clarity, the trait-relevant behavior is only overt behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Counterfactual Reaction Profile style from Alfano (2013). 
6
 It is only for simplicity sake that Table 3 has three Criterial Feature columns and three Relevant Situational 
Condition rows. A counterfactual reaction profile could be constructed with many more rows and columns. 
 72 
 
Table 4: Inconsistent Counterfactual Reaction Profile 
 Lost Child Seriously Injured 
Bystander 
Individual in 
Mourning  
Good Mood Renders help to the 
individual in need. 
Does not render help 
to the individual in 
need. 
Renders help to the 
individual in need.  
Neutral Mood Renders help to the 
individual in need. 
Does not render help to the individual in need.  
Bad Mood Renders help to the individual in need. 
 
 
Table 5: Potential Compassion Counterfactual Reaction Profile 
 Lost Child Seriously Injured 
Bystander 
Individual in 
Mourning  
Good Mood Renders help to the individual in need. 
Neutral Mood  
Does not render help to the individual in need.  Bad Mood 
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Table 6: Potential Compassion Counterfactual Reaction Profile 
 Lost Child Seriously 
Injured Bystander 
Individual in 
Mourning  
No other potential 
helpers present 
 
Renders help to the individual in need. 
At least one other 
potential helper 
present 
 
Does not render help to the individual in need.  
 
Notice that Tables 4-6 have the same Criterial Features, which collectively are 
opportunities to show compassion. A lost child, an injured bystander, or someone in mourning 
provide appropriate opportunities for compassion. The Response Individuating Features provide 
the full range of the agent opportunities. The trait depicted in Table 4 fails to be consistent by 
Consistency. In rows 1 and 2, the trait-relevant behavior varies between compassion-relevant 
behaviors (e.g., helping the lost child) to failures of the same kind of behavior (e.g., failing to 
help the seriously injured bystander). While row 3 indicates the same compassion-relevant 
behavior for each Criterial features, Consistency demands this be the case for each Response 
Individuating Feature row.
7
 
 Tables 5 and 6 are indicative of a trait that meets the requirements of 
Consistency, though neither is necessarily to be identified with compassion. In reality, we might 
expect the Response Individuating Features to be a bit more complicated and finely grained 
(e.g., Good mood, no other potential helpers, appropriate lighting, safe area etc.). However, 
given much of the evidence from social psychology, there are at least some Response 
                                                          
7
 It could be the case that Consistency would be secured with different Response Individuating Features in rows 1 
and 2, while row 3 remained the same. But as it stands, Table 4 is not indicative of Consistency. 
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Individuating Features that have powerful enough influences on responses such that a 
counterfactual reaction profile would not be overly complicated.  
There are important limits on what kinds of features can be Response Individual Features 
for fulfilling the requirements of Consistency. For example, the trait-irrelevant features 
discussed in chapter 3 could not function as Response Individuating Features for Consistency. 
By definition, the trait-irrelevant features are minor and morally irrelevant features shown to 
have a significant influence on behavior. But their effect on behavior is not enough to sustain 
certain behavior responses across multiple situations. Indeed, they are partially of interest 
particularly because they coincide with inconsistent behavior. For example, the while finding a 
dime in a phone booth was related in helpfulness in the associated experimental conditions, it is 
not as though all helpful behavior is tied to the finding of dimes. If it were the case that a certain 
situational feature largely determined behavior, it would hardly be indicative of inconsistent 
behavior. It’s certainly possible that some surprisingly findings in the experimental data may turn 
out to be a very strong determinate of behavior, but this would require additional analysis. In any 
event, if this were the case, it would no longer qualify as a trait-irrelevant factor, in which case it 
would no longer be a part of the situationist data.  
With a more detailed conception of consistency in mind, I turn to specific accounts of 
virtue and character that argue that most people do, in fact, possess consistent traits. If they are 
correct, defenders of virtue ethics can resist charges of pervasive behavioral inconsistency.  
IV. Responses to Charges of Inconsistency 
Within the character debate, a popular way of answering charges of behavioral 
inconsistency is to make use of a distinction made prominent by Mischel and colleagues 
(Mischel and Shoda 1995; Shoda 1999) of nominal features and psychological features. 
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Importantly, the use of the term nominal here is not the common parlance of philosophical 
discussion. A nominal feature is an objective feature of a situation, such as the presence of 
absence of a particular object. Nominal features are readily identifiable from a 3
rd
 person 
perspective. Another way of thinking about nominal features is that they are how an 
experimenter would describe the experimental conditions of their study. Psychological features 
are aspects of a situation as interpreted by someone in the situation. For example, Jamie is 
talking a walk through the forest, and notices a rustling bush nearby and quickly turns around 
and sprints away. A nominal feature of the situation is the moving bush, and so we might index 
Jamie’s retreat with respect to a rustling bush. But suppose Jamie had interpreted the rustling 
bush as an indication of a dangerous animal. Describing Jamie’s response by a psychological 
feature would be to index the retreat with respect to a construal of danger or a reasons-to-flee, 
not a rustling bush. 
Snow (2010) and Russell (2009) argue that the appearance of pervasive behavioral 
inconsistency results from over focusing on the nominal features of situations found in the 
relevant psychological experiments (e.g., the presence of fragrant, freshly baked bread), rather 
than psychological features relative to the subjects in those experiments (e.g., the subject’s 
pleasant mood). That is, the Response Individuating Features mentioned above should be 
characterized by psychological features of the individual whose response is being observed. The 
general flavor of the response by Snow and Russell is that by downplaying, or even ignoring, the 
psychological features salient to the agent, it is easy to misconstrue certain patterns of overt 
behavior as inconsistent. While the finding of a dime or the smell of fresh bread significantly 
changing someone’s helpfulness might seem to support claims of inconsistency, if categorized 
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instead with respect to the person’s mood or, better yet, their construal of the situation as 
demanding helpfulness, the inconsistency disappears. 
Both Snow and Russell are interested in securing a version of consistency supported by 
empirical observation.
8
 This is in line with the interest in psychological realism discussed in 
chapter 2. Snow and Russell’s respective theories of virtue are informed by the cognitive-
affective personality system (CAPS) model of human behavior. The CAPS model supposedly 
justifies shifting the focus from nominal to psychological features of the situation for discussions 
of consistency. 
V. The CAPS Model of Consistency 
The CAPS model was first proposed by Mischel and Shoda (1995) as a way of re-
categorizing the structure of human personality.
9
 Part of the motivation for the development of 
the CAPS model was a response to the apparent inadequacy of many traditional understandings 
of traits as broad-based overt behavioral dispositions. Instead, the CAPS model focuses on the 
specific capacities, processes, and psychological states of the individual. This includes particular 
information encoding strategies, self-regulatory systems, and stimulus outcome expectances 
(among many others).
10
 The CAPS model characterizes behavior not merely as response to 
particular stimuli, but also as deriving from the individual understanding of themselves in a 
particular situation. By including the personal understanding of oneself in the situation, behavior 
can seem less inconsistent. For example, in understanding someone’s reaction to being chastised, 
it is not enough that they are being chastised by someone. What also needs to be considered is if 
the individual understands themselves as being chastised by a peer or an authority figure, viz., 
                                                          
8
 Snow (2010); Russell (2009) 
9
 Many preliminaries to the CAPS model were outlined in Mischel (1973). 
10
 Miller (2014: 112). 
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what is salient to the subject.
11
 By only focusing on the nominal features of the situation (subject 
is being chastised in the cafeteria), the features of the situation that the subject is reacting to are 
incomplete. Keeping with same example, even if an observer knows that the chastiser is an 
authority figure, this isn’t necessarily the same as how the subject understands the chastiser. If 
the observer is not categorizing the situational features in the same way as the subject, behavior 
might be miscategorized as inconsistent. 
Further preciosities of the CAPS model are unneeded, as there is little that seems 
controversial with respect to potential applications to virtue and virtue theory.
12
 The CAPS 
model emphasizes subjective construal and salience of features of the situation (i.e., 
psychological features) as the proper focus for determining consistency. This provides for an 
empirical account of what many defenders of virtue ethics cite as reasons to doubt to the force of 
situationist criticism.
13
  Evidence cited by situationist highlights the influence of nominal 
features of the situation, and not the psychological features. While the CAPS model seems to 
offer an effective way of explaining away inconsistency, it invites problems as a model for 
understanding virtue. For the remainder of this section, I present Russel and Snow endorsement 
the CAPS model and their attempt at avoiding the inconsistency charges of the situationist. 
Russell clearly pushes concerns for consistency to the psychological, as he notes “since it 
is the subject’s personality that is in question, it seem appropriate to classify situations and 
behaviors from the subject’s point of view, in which case differences in observed behaviors are 
less interesting than differences in how subjects view their surroundings and adjust their 
                                                          
11
 Snow (2010:18-23). 
12
 It’s worth noting that some, like Christian Miller, argue that the CAPS model is little more than a re-packaged 
model of uncontroversial elementals of folk psychology. See Miller (2014:105-128). 
13
 Kamtekar (2004) emphasizes the importance of such features over the nominal, though not quite in the language 
of CAPS. 
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behaviors to them.”14 Additionally, he specifically cautions against the use of nominal 
consistency, since even if one were to observe consistent behavior across nominally different 
situations, chances are is it not the same, or even similar, psychological structures that are 
causing same behavior. This is important for Russell’s account, as he wants to identify virtue, in 
part, with responsiveness to particular reasons for action.
15
 To be consistently compassionate, for 
Russell, is to consistently put others’ interest above one’s own in those situations appropriate to 
do so. While compassion-relevant behavior may result across a wide variety of nominal 
situations, this is not sufficient to conclude that the agent is being sensitive compassionate 
related reasons in each case. What is important is that, from the subject’s perspective, the 
situation provided appropriate reasons to be compassionate. Given the possible ambiguity in only 
interpreting situations based on nominal differences, virtue attribution based on purely nominal 
features may be premature or even inappropriate. 
Snow raises similar worries as those voiced by Russell, and also argues for a conception 
of virtue that also relies on the CAPS model. With regard to consistency, Snow shares Russell’s 
worries about the overreliance on nominal features of a situation for determinations of 
consistency, and that the situationists’ insistence on nominal standards unfairly stacks the deck 
against defenders of virtue. Snow notes, “situationists define situations solely in terms of their 
[nominal] features… Mischel and Shoda thought that studying behavior in situations defined 
solely in [nominal] terms was the wrong place to look for behavioral consistency. When they 
redefined situations in terms of the meanings of situations have for subjects, they found evidence 
of behavioral regularities that cross objectively different situation-types.”16 Snow goes on to cite 
a study tracking children’s behavior with respect to things like reprimands or verbal aggression 
                                                          
14
 Russell (2009:245) 
15
 Ibid., 189. 
16
 Snow (2010:18) 
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from peers and adults, and that the behavior of these children was actually quite consistent when 
categorized by how the children construed the person giving out the reprimand (e.g., adult vs. 
peer), rather than nominal features (e.g., residence hall vs. cafeteria).
17
  
The general strategy by defenders of virtue using the CAPS model is secure consistency 
by shifting focus from nominal to psychological features of a situation. On the surface, this 
seems to be a promising strategy, as much of the situationist evidence relies on apparent 
behavioral inconsistency with respect to nominal features. People were more helpful when they 
found a dime as opposed to an empty coin return, less likely to check on someone in danger 
when there were more people around, and more likely to administer increasingly dangerous 
electric shocks if there was a scientist standing next to them. But importantly not just any version 
of consistency will do. As Russell himself notes, “Pick any set of behaviors, and there will 
usually be some standard or other relative to which they can be assessed as consistent. The fact 
that an agent can generally find some standard relative to which his or her behaviors come out 
consistent is undeniable, but uninteresting.”18 In short, the consistency for a virtue ethical theory 
needs to be normatively adequate as well as supported by empirical findings.  
VI. Consistency and Normative Adequacy  
Not just any form of consistency will do for defenders of an empirically grounded theory 
of virtue.
19
  The consistency should be identified relative to a normatively adequate standard. For 
virtue ethics, the standard of consistency can’t solely be consistent to the individual’s personal 
standards. Russell notes that “‘generosity by one’s own lights’ surely is not the same thing as 
generosity proper.”20 Most patterns of behavior are consistent relative to some standard, but 
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 Ibid., 23. 
18
 Russell (2009:301). See also similar comments in Doris (2002:76-85). 
19
 Portions of the remaining sections are adapted from Doris and Spino (2015). 
20
 Russell (2009:305). 
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many of these consistencies may be uninformative or trivial.  The run of behaviors a, d, g, h, j p, 
p, f, a is consistent relative to the disposition (or family of dispositions) to produce just that run 
of behaviors – call it disposition ADGHJPPFA, but it’s entirely unclear if such behaviors are 
motivated by, for example, the types of reasons for action that are of interest to the virtue 
ethicist. It hardly seems appropriate as the type of consistency virtue ethics is after. For example, 
take a very simple trait having to do with honesty, called “interval honesty.”  Greg is possessed 
of interval honesty, which means that, like an athlete alternating periods of exertion and 
recovery, when Greg exercises honesty, he needs to “sit out” the next opportunity; Greg has 
psychological resources sufficient only to exercise honesty in every other honesty relevant 
situation.  If we let h stand for honesty-relevant behavior, and d stand for dishonest-relevant 
behavior, Greg’s behavior will look, quite uniformly, like this: hdhdhdhdhdhdhd.  
Greg’s hdhdhdhdhdhdhd behavior is, in some sense, consistent; it is, as Russell or Snow 
might put it, behavior indicative of a consistent trait. The consistency, of course, is relative to 
psychological situations: ones where Greg is morally exhausted and ones where he is not.  His 
exhaustion might cause him not to register the morally problematic features of the dishonest 
behavior he’s engaging in. But nominal standards cannot completely drop out of the discussion 
for something like honesty. There is some evidence that people’s attributive standards for 
honesty are rather demanding (Gidron et al. 1993); to earn the title of honesty, you have to be 
honest on some tolerably high percentage of the occasions where honesty is called for.  That’s 
not Greg, who is honest, at best about half the time. The general point is that identifying 
psychological consistency comes apart from nominal consistency.
21
 One cannot, however, 
simply insist on nominal consistency as the only normatively adequate standard of consistency 
for virtue ethics without begging the question against those like Russell and Snow. But it is fair 
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 Doris (2002: 76-85). 
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to insist that the psychological consistency endorsed by Russell and Snow also be normatively 
adequate.  
Russell describes a normatively adequate form of consistency, under the CAPS model, as 
a consistent responsiveness “to reasons that can be endorsed in an overall way from within an 
ethical outlook in equilibrium.”22 Exactly what counts as the right kinds of reasons is not 
developed by Russell or Snow, but this is not their goal. Russell’s account of a normatively 
adequate conception of virtue though seems to indirectly depend on nominal consistency, which 
he readily admits would be problematic.
23
 But digging a bit deeper into Russell’s accounts 
reveals just this kind of problem. 
Russell cites the importance of robust traits as those which “produce consistent behaviors 
across situations, where those behaviors are understood in psychological rather than nominal 
terms – as the just person would regard them, say.”24 A crucial element to this standard though is 
the qualification of the psychological requirement being as the ‘just person would regard them’. 
Importantly, Russell here is talking about traits in general, not just the virtues. Couple this 
standard with the aforementioned responsiveness to ethically endorsable reasons, and Russell 
ends up endorsing an indirect nominal consistency standard for normative adequacy. 
To see how Russell ends up falling into endorsing nominal consistency, consider a 
virtuous individual that is responsive to ethically endorsable reasons. Certainly, there are robust, 
purely psychological components to this individual’s perspective. Those situations construed as 
demanding compassionate or courageous action should (to a sufficient level of regularity) move 
the individual to the appropriate action in the right kind of way. But to be a fully endorsable 
perspective, there must be some kind of connection to objective features of the world. Even if the 
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 Russell (2009: 329). 
23
 Russell (2009:329). 
24
 Ibid., 326. 
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individual is responsive to all the right kinds of reasons when they notice them, but are 
constantly missing what, on reflection, are obvious reasons for and against certain action, this 
would hardly be an endorsable ethical position. If the standard of consistency can stop at purely 
subjective construal, then there appears to be little difference between someone being sensitive to 
and moved by morally relevant external factors, and the person that has such a warped 
perspective that nothing is worthy of their personal intervention. Consider the following tables 
representing a charitable trait by a virtuous agent and an Ebenezer Scrooge-type character. For 
the sake of simplify, assume the individual in question has a financial means to donate without 
significant cost to themselves. 
Table 7: Charity for the Virtuous Counterfactual Reaction Profile 
 Oxfam 
donation drive 
Local soup 
kitchen 
Panhandler 
 
Charity is understood 
as worthy of support 
 
Renders help to the individual in need. 
 
Charity is understood 
as not worthy of 
support 
 
Does not render help to the individual in need.  
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Table 8: Charity for Ebenezer Scrooge-type Counterfactual Reaction Profile 
 Oxfam 
donation drive 
Local soup 
kitchen 
Panhandler 
 
Charity is understood 
as worthy of support 
 
Renders help to the individual in need. 
 
Charity is understood 
as not worthy of 
support 
 
Does not render help to the individual in need.  
 
If the Response Individuating Features can be completely severed from nominal features, 
the virtuous and Scrooge-type both appear to have the same trait, given they both act on their 
considered judgments regarding the charity. This exemplifies precisely the problem with purely 
psychological accounts of consistency of the kind endorsed by Snow and Russell. 
To be clear, I am not demanding that normative adequacy for consistency is restricted to 
nominal concerns.  Keeping with the above theme, a person doesn’t lose the title of charity 
because they pass on opportunities to give to causes they see as unworthy when most other might 
judge otherwise. The attribution of charity seems to require consistent giving (within a person’s 
means) to causes the person judges to be worthwhile.  If that’s true, specification of 
psychological situations is integral to determining if someone has a consistent trait of charity.  
But however the specifics of consistency get sorted out, it needs to get sorted out in a way that 
limits individual latitude: Ebenezer Scrooge isn’t charitable.  In short, nominal features are 
necessary for a normatively adequate account of consistency. Not to the exclusion of the 
psychological of course. But ignoring the nominal completely in the name of securing some kind 
of consistency results in a rather strange normative standard where individual perspectives can 
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make all the difference. If the only standard is psychological, it seems quite easy to act, 
characteristically, as the virtuous agent would. Taking on nominal demands for consistency, of 
course, makes virtue ethicists more vulnerable to situationist worries, but the strategy for 
avoiding such an issue is done at the expense of normative adequacy.
 25
   
Insisting on purely psychological accounts of consistency can also put an account of 
virtue at odds with some foundational concepts found in Aristotle’s original work. While it is not 
required that virtue ethics always connect with Aristotle, enough proponents of virtue ethics 
draw inspiration from the Nicomachean Ethics that some incompatibility is worth noting. In 
Book III, chapter 1, Aristotle distinguishes between voluntary, involuntary, and nonvoluntary 
actions. In short, voluntary actions have their cause from the agent and are not due to ignorance. 
The actions which are not voluntary are the one of interest here (EN 111-b25-111a7). 
Involuntary actions are caused by ignorance, where the agent is unaware certain particulars of a 
situation, such as an agent thinking they are about to take a bite of a fresh apple, but it turns out 
to be a decorative piece of plastic fruit. Nonvoluntary actions are done in ignorance, where the 
agent understands the particulars of a situation, but is ignorant of the kind of action they are 
going to take. For example, someone steals from the local Salvation Army, fully aware of what 
they are doing and knowing the consequences, but not appreciating that this cannot be a right 
action. But certain Nonvoluntary actions, characterized by purely psychological features and 
understood as the product of a trait of some kind, could end up structurally looking like a virtue. 
The agent performs actions they understand as permissible for themselves, and does not perform 
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 Snow (2010:106-108)  pushes too far in the direction of holding subjective construal as the only important 
standard of consistency. 
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those understood as impermissible. Without any limits on how the psychological features 
structure consistency, a trait qualifying as consistent can be a rather vacuous distinction.
26
         
The CAPS model, endorsed by Russell and Snow, is not the only approach to an 
empirically grounded theory of character. In the next section, I discuss a novel approach to 
character that is, in part, meant to show a new way of understanding the current state of most 
people’s character that also secures an empirically adequate conception of consistency without 
the problems of the CAPS model.  
VII. Mixed Traits (Miller) 
Miller addresses the issue of inconsistency as well, though not in the way that most 
defenders of virtue ethics do. He argues that traditional virtues and vices are largely absent from 
the human population. Miller insists, however, that human behavior is frequently ordered by 
global traits. Without necessarily endorsing any particular version of virtue ethics, Miller denies 
the situationist claim regarding pervasive behavioral consistency. 
According to Miller (2014: 195), there is a type of trait widely instantiated in the human 
population, which he calls “mixed.”  Mixed traits are neither virtues nor vices; they do not 
reliably dispose the possessor to good or bad behavior in across situations (Miller 2014: 207-
209).  Rather than having virtues or vices, the vast majority of people possess such traits as 
mixed aggression traits, mixed helping traits, mixed cheating traits, and so on -- traits which 
sometimes issue in behavior conforming to the behavior type featured in their names, and other 
times the opposite. But these traits are supposed to be operative across a wide range of situations, 
and therefore deserve to be termed global.  Recall from chapter 2 that global traits are those that 
are stable and consistent. Thus, while Miller argues for a globalist theory of character, he 
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 Shifting to the discussion to consistency of proper understanding of situations and actions can fall prey to a whole 
other area of troubling inconsistency. See Olin and Doris (2014).  
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remains a skeptic about virtue and vice; although global traits are widely instantiated, consistent 
virtues and vices aren’t.  
Miller (2013; 2014) offers detailed consideration of the various psychological 
experiments cited by situationists without attempting to deny the relevance of the data. He does, 
however, deny that the data demonstrates behavioral inconsistency. Like Snow and Russell, 
Miller stresses the importance of the psychological features for consistency considerations of 
mixed traits; activation or inhibition of mixed traits by psychological features effects orderly 
patterns of trait-relevant behavior. For example, suppose a person consistently helps in situations 
when they are in a good mood and consistently doesn’t help when in a bad mood. While these 
people are not globally helpful, so the story goes, they are globally mood-dependent-helpful.  For 
Miller, mixed traits are an empirically supported type of global trait that is widely instantiated in 
the population (Miller 2014: 195, 200). One important difference to the CAPS approach 
endorsed by Snow and Russell is that Miller is not maintaining a consistency based on personal 
construal of the situation, but a consistency with respect what activates or inhibits various traits 
of character. Construal can be allowed to vary widely. Consistency is found from the regular 
activation or inhibiting of mixed-trait expression by particular psychological processes. For 
example, the consistency of the mixed-helping trait is supported by guilt regularly activating that 
trait across a wide variety of circumstances. Miller preserves reference to nominal features, 
which induce guilt, but maintains the importance of psychological processes. 
Miller’s position appears well equipped to handle much of the situationist skepticism 
leveled at global character traits.  But matters become more complicated when one considers just 
how many enhancers and inhibitors may be at work in a single mixed trait.  Consider the 
example of someone alleviating guilt by helping others.  All else being equal, helping while 
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guilty is supposed to be consistent across a wide-variety of situations.  But it’s not just guilt that 
is relevant to helping.  On Miller’s (2013: 183) own description, there are many additional 
psychological factors beyond guilt that need to be accounted for, such as emotions, beliefs, and 
desires. When all of these factors are considered, it looks as though the relevant admixture of 
inhibitors and enhancers effecting any instance of helping behavior will approach the singular, 
meaning that behavior looks highly situationally specific. This seems to be just another way of 
getting to the situationist conclusion.   
To put the above point another way, in situation s, say, x amount of guilt, y amount of 
embarrassment, z amount of anger (to name only three), plus beliefs and desires related to s-like 
situations, generally results in behavior b.  It seems unreasonable to expect that the same 
psychological combination will ever occur again in a different situation.  After all, any 
circumstance involves a large number of psychological features, some of which may be unique 
(or approaching unique), and these various features may figure in some indefinitely large number 
of combinations, which may themselves be unique (or approaching unique). For example, Sam is 
in a good mood today, but will Sam ever be in this particular good mood ever again, since Sam 
has just received their first tenure-track job? Alternatively, Sam was in a bad mood last fall, but 
will Sam ever be in that particular bad mood ever again since it was the result of a favorite 
sports team losing a championship and ruining their improbably perfect season?  If so many 
psychological situations matter to mixed traits, and their appearance and combination in any 
given life cannot readily be expected to be highly reliable, consistency of behavior in this picture 
starts to look a bit strange. Consider the table below. 
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Table 9: Mixed-helping trait
27
 
 Stranger asks for change for a dollar 
Embarrassment > anger > guilt Helps individual 
Embarrassment > guilt > anger Does not help individual 
Anger > embarrassment > guilt Helps individual 
Anger > guilt > embarrassment Helps individual 
Guilt > embarrassment > anger Does not help individual 
Guilt > anger > embarrassment Helps individual 
 
Note that the “ > ” symbol is being used to indicate the relevant levels of the mental state 
disposition of the agent. “Embarrassment > anger > guilt” indicates that the agent feels more 
embarrassed than angry, and more angry than guilty. While this might be difficult to determine 
with any level of clarity in the real world, my argument does not turn on this determination. It is 
merely meant as a possible way in which someone’s mixed-trait might help determine behavior 
that is consistent with Miller’s account. 
For the sake of argument, we can assume the agent in question will similarly make/not 
make change in repeated iterations of the same situation (levels of embarrassment, anger, and 
guilt, coupled with someone asking for change). With stability fixed, however, problems quickly 
surface when considering consistency. By definition, in order to be consistent, the agent’s 
behavior should remain the same as we expand the variety of the criterial features of the 
situation. 
 
                                                          
27
 The varying levels of embarrassment, empathy, and guilt are merely meant to capture Miller’s conception of 
mixed-traits being dependent on the mental states of the agent for evaluating stability/consistency.  
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Table 10: Mixed-helping trait
28
 
 Stranger asks for 
change for a dollar 
Lost tourist asks for 
directions 
Embarrassment > anger > guilt Helps individual Does not help 
individual 
Embarrassment > guilt > anger Does not help 
individual 
Helps individual 
Anger > embarrassment > guilt Helps individual Does not help 
individual 
Anger > guilt > embarrassment Helps individual Helps individual 
Guilt > embarrassment > anger Does not help 
individual 
Helps individual 
Guilt > anger > embarrassment Helps individual Does not help 
individual 
 
Here, as Miller predicts, we appear to have apparent behavioral inconsistency. But 
supposedly the inconsistency vanishes when we also consider things like the beliefs and desires 
of the agent. Consider the first row of the table, where the agent makes change for a dollar, but 
doesn’t direct the lost tourist. The inconsistency might be explained away by the presence of 
specific beliefs and desires regarding helping each of the people in need, perhaps beliefs about 
tourists ruining the regular traffic flow. Or perhaps the belief that making change for a stranger 
will alleviate some of the felt embarrassment, but directing a tourist will not. Of course, if beliefs 
and desires are making a significant difference, the table needs to be expanded with more rows. 
The problem, as mentioned earlier, is that the relevant conditions would become increasingly 
specific to particular situations to explain away inconsistency.  
                                                          
28
 The varying levels of embarrassment, empathy, and guilt are merely meant to capture Miller’s conception of 
mixed-traits capturing the mental states of the agent for evaluating stability/consistency.  
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The above example seems to put Miller in an awkward position regarding an important 
desideratum in theory choice; ceteris paribus, simpler theories are preferred over more complex 
ones. How simplicity ought to be understood is, of course, the subject of much discussion.
29
  But 
mixed traits, considering the numerousness of their situational inputs, psychological processes, 
and behavioral outputs, are anything but simple. But mere complexity is not, by itself, a reason to 
dismiss a theory; human psychology is complex, and a complex theory may be the only sort fit to 
secure psychological realism.
30
 
The problem with the complexity of the mixed-trait account, however, is that it’s hard to 
see what acting inconsistently is supposed to look like.
31
 With so many enhancers and inhibitors 
at play for each trait, there will always be some combination of psychological factors relevant to 
one or another mixed trait. At least in the case of Russel and Snow’s account, psychological 
features are indexed to construal. An agent can act inconsistently if, for example, they fail to act 
when they’ve deemed that they should act – recognition of personal failures is a familiar 
experience. Miller might avoid such a problem if he identified non-arbitrary standards for 
grouping together a particular set of beliefs, desires, and other psychological features of 
situations as the grounds for attributing a mixed trait.  But on Miller’s description of mixed traits, 
it looks like any psychological process associated with the behavior of interest -- or its absence -- 
is to be welcomed as another component of the mixed trait.
32
 When providing a mixed trait 
explanation, one can always recruit additional psychological processes to demonstrate why it is 
                                                          
29
 Mackonis (2013). 
30
 Indeed, “local” trait theory (Doris 2002; Upton 2009), which also makes empirical adequacy paramount, may also 
fail standards of simplicity.  
31
 Miller (2013: 20n38) briefly notes this worry; he suggests that mixed trait theory allows for inconsistency in terms 
of conflict between an actor’s conscious and unconscious psychological states.  This is an interesting response, but is 
in need of further development, since a mixed trait could be specified in terms of just such a conflict: e.g., a mixed 
aggression trait where the possessor is aggressive when experiencing a conflict between conscious deference and 
unconscious resentment and passive when the conflict is between conscious resentment and unconscious deference. 
32
 For some of Miller’s discussion of these issues, in particular with respect to mixed helping traits, see Miller (2013: 
180-199). 
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the mixed trait helped produce the trait-relevant behavior.  Aggression, for instance, could have 
been activated by feelings of anger, frustration, shame, or a desire to maintain a positive self-
image.  This is only a partial list, which Miller (2013: 271-272) claims isn’t comprehensive; the 
concern is that the inclusion of so many enhancers and inhibitors means the mixed trait construct 
can be so extensively qualified that there ceases to be any kind of trait-relevant behavior that is 
inconsistent with a trait the agent possesses.  To say someone’s aggression was due to her 
possession of a mixed aggression trait reduces to saying her aggression was caused, in part, by 
the agent’s psychology.   
If inconsistent trait-relevant behavior becomes nearly impossible, the familiar thought 
that people sometimes act “out of character” does so as well. It seems right to say that most 
people do not act in accordance with their character, whatever form it may take, 100% of the 
time.  But on the mixed trait framework, one can explain any behavior as being in-character -- in 
some mixed-character, that is. The person who fails to act helpfully in circumstances where they 
have always done so previously can be said to be acting in character after all; on the mixed trait 
framework, there may be a novel psychological situation such that, were we aware of it, we 
would expect the behavior that was observed.  For example, suppose Sara has been observed 
consistently being helpful when in a good mood, and consistently unhelpful when in a bad mood, 
but is then seen being consistently helpful even in situations where her mood is especially foul. 
Say it turns out that Sara’s helpfulness has been significantly enhanced by the presence of her co-
workers at a new job, where she is trying to foster friendships with a new peer group (and no 
additional helpfulness is observed elsewhere). The desire for acceptance could just be taken as a 
new feature of her mixed-helpfulness trait, rather than a significant departure from her character.  
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Miller should not be cast as a defender of virtue ethics (pace Annas 2011: 173n8), and so 
the worries I am raising with respect to his views are not its incompatibility with certain forms of 
virtue ethics.  The problem, as I see it, is that the incredible complexity of the mixed-trait 
framework make inconsistent or “out of character” behavior nearly impossible. Miller’s theory 
of character, then, loses important phenomena of generally accepted understandings of character. 
Mixed-trait theory, as defined earlier, fails to be empirically adequate, and thus hardly seems 
suitable as a model of baseline character in the empirically minded character debate. 
VIII. Concluding Thoughts 
In the preceding discussion, I’ve considered two approaches to securing some form of 
consistency to answer situationist charges of pervasive behavioral inconsistency. For the CAPS 
models of Russell and Snow, my primary worry was that it goes too far in emphasizing the 
psychological features over nominal features. Neglecting nominal features results in a lack of 
normative adequacy. Judgments regarding virtue are evaluative judgments, referencing 
evaluative standards, and it is plausibly thought that these standards have to do with nominal 
features of the situation.  If there’s a virtue of honesty, someone like Greg, with his interval 
honesty, certainly doesn’t have it.  But if while in the exhausted state, Greg never construes 
situations as demanding honesty from him, then he appears to meet the standards of acting 
consistency given by the CAPS models. It is strange to claim that the standard of consistency 
relevant for the virtue of honesty would not involve nominal situations. 
For Miller’s mixed-trait theory, the general worry is that consistency is secured much too 
easily, and so the very possibility of inconsistent or “out of character” behavior disappears. 
While Miller does not have a specific theory of virtue he is defending, he does think that he can 
respond to the main criticism from situationists that our behavior fails to follow from any 
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empirically recognizable consistent trait. If Miller is right, defenders of virtue ethics would have 
a much more secure starting point for showing how one can start on the path to being virtuous. In 
would, in part, address the worry from chapter 2 of virtue expecting us to develop from non-
global traits to global ones. Miller theory, however, fails as an empirically adequate theory, as it 
does not accommodate recognizable phenomena from philosophical and everyday 
understandings of character. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
PROMISING APPROACHES TO VIRTUE ETHICS 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The focus of the preceding chapters has been to show why many contemporary 
approaches to virtue ethics face serious difficulties in light of empirically-based criticism from 
situationists. Specifically, many approaches to virtue ethics which maintain the importance of 
global traits of character, which are necessary for virtue possession, have serious problems as to 
there relevance for human beings, such as they are. Overall the discussion has been largely 
critical of the virtue ethics tradition. Importantly though, the real target of criticism has been the 
particular structure of global traits, not virtue ethics as a whole. While many versions of virtue 
ethics are committed to the actual instantiation of global traits, there are accounts without such a 
commitment. In this chapter, I discuss what I consider to be the two of the most promising virtue 
ethical accounts, which are categorized as instrumentalist accounts of virtue, that are not 
threatened by situationist worries. Additionally, I discuss the important structural differences 
between instrumentalist accounts of virtue and that majority of virtue ethical accounts discussed 
thus far, as well as some objections to the instrumentalist approaches I highlight.  
In section II, I give an overview of instrumentalist accounts of virtue, and the main points 
of difference between them and the globalist accounts discussed thus far. Section III goes into 
the specifics of two prominent instrumentalist accounts, namely Julia Driver and Lorraine 
Besser-Jones’ respective accounts. This will set the stage for the investigation of attempted 
applications of virtue ethics to normative business ethics, which is the focus of the final chapter. 
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 II. Instrumentalist Accounts of Virtue 
A theory of virtue is instrumentalist just in case there is no dependence on intrinsic value 
to any individual state of character and the value of states of character is determined by how 
effective it is in bringing about particular states of affairs. Instrumentalist theories of virtue, 
while often maintaining the importance of a realistic moral psychology, are not committed to the 
global trait view so common in the virtue ethics literature that has been discussed throughout this 
dissertation. 
In its general structure, instrumentalist accounts of virtue are similar to certain 
consequentialist approaches to ethics.
1
 In consequentialist moral theories, particular act-types do 
not have an intrinsic moral value. The moral value of the act is determined by the particular 
consequences caused by the act. Lying, for example, is morally good or bad depending on what 
results from the actual lie. The particular consequentialist account needs to specify which 
consequences are to be evaluated, be it by levels of pleasure, happiness, or preference 
satisfaction, to name only a few. Similarly, instrumentalist accounts of virtue must specify what 
particular states of character should help produce in order to determine the particular value of 
those states of character. As a result, the virtuous state(s) of character may vary widely from 
traditional virtue ethical accounts.  
The importance of consistency for many traditional accounts of virtue ethics is not 
necessarily found in instrumentalist accounts. A particular range of trait-relevant behaviors 
across a range of situational features is not required for any particular trait to produce the 
targeted instrumental value. Indeed, as is made clearer in later sections, proponents of 
                                                          
1
 Not to be confused with consequentialist instrumental theories of virtue (e.g., Driver 2001) which I discuss below. 
The analogy here is just to help clarify what an instrumental theory of virtue actually is. 
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instrumentalist views should be troubled little by the seemingly fragmentary nature of our 
characters. 
With these preliminaries out of the way, I now turn to two well-developed instrumental 
accounts that both avoid the problems of situationism and also provide a robust account of virtue 
that is quite compatible with much of the psychological data available. 
III. Specific Instrumentalist Accounts of Virtue 
a. Driver 
Julia Driver’s consequentialist account of virtue mimics the surface simplicity of other 
consequentialist theories. For Driver, a virtue is “a character trait (disposition or cluster of 
dispositions) that, generally speaking, produces good consequences for others.”2  As is clear 
from the rendering, Driver’s account allows for immense flexibility as to what exactly counts as 
a virtue. Her account further subdivides virtues as being moral virtues or prudential virtues. 
Moral virtues are those traits which generate the greatest benefit for others, while prudential 
virtues benefit the agent who possess the virtue.
3
 For example, a trait which disposes the 
individual toward sacrificing their own time and resources toward furthering the safety of others 
is an example of a moral virtue. In contrast, an example of a prudential virtue would be 
something like a “silver tongue”, where one is able to quickly and easily persuade others to a 
particular point of view. Moral and prudential virtues can clearly come apart, as evidenced by 
Driver’s own example of complete self-sacrifice as an example of a moral virtue. The solider that 
throws himself on top of the enemy grenade that was lobbed into their squad clearly produces 
good consequences for others, but is certainly gaining no personal benefit from sacrificing their 
life in this way. 
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 Driver (2001:60). 
3
 Ibid., 45. 
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There is of course much more to Driver’s account than my brief overview. The point I am 
trying to make though is that it is not a mere conceptual possibility that some accounts of virtue 
ethics are not threatened by situationist criticism. This is not to say that Driver’s consequentialist 
view of virtue is without its own difficulties. Driver endorsement of consequences being the 
determining factor for the value of traits unsurprisingly inherits some of the difficulties 
commonly posed to more general consequentialist views. But then, such difficulties hardly leave 
consequentialist views without supporters.  
Given that Driver’s account is a radical departure from traditional accounts of virtue, it 
comes as little surprise that her view has come under criticism for just such a departure. Snow 
argues that Driver’s account allows for virtues without that “appropriate motivation and practical 
wisdom” found in traditional accounts of, for example, justice.4 The worry by Snow here is that 
the officer of the court who executes their duties from the kinds of trait(s) normally attributed to 
traditional accounts of virtue is no different from the officer that does their job purely for 
political gains (assuming they have equal success). Snow notes, “On Driver’s view, the traits that 
count as virtues are unrecognizable as virtues.”5 Unfortunately, Snow doesn’t elaborate much on 
this point, and as it stands, the complaint is a bit shallow.
6
 That Driver’s view may be a bit 
counter-intuitive to what we normally think of as virtues is certainly true, but this is hardly a 
good reason to dismiss the view out of hand. The traditional conception of virtue that Snow 
compares Driver’s view to is largely in trouble, given the situationist worries discussed 
throughout this dissertation. While I will not pretend to speak for Driver, it doesn’t seem all that 
strange to consider switching from a normatively troubled account for virtue, unsuitable for 
human beings such as they are, to an empirically viable and tractable approach to virtue. 
                                                          
4
 Snow (2010:6). 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 In this section of Snow’s book, she goes on to similarly give brief criticisms of other approaches to virtue ethics.  
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b. Besser-Jones 
Besser-Jones’ theory of virtue is unabashedly empirically minded. She commits to 
moderate psychological realism, which sets up much of the direction and tone for her 
eudaimonic approach to virtue ethics. Moderate psychological realism is the view that moral 
theorizing should be restricted to “a psychologically realistic understanding of what sorts of 
behavior, belief formation, and decision-making processes can be reasonably expected of 
people.”7 There is no ambiguity here as to whether or not the goal is the actual instantiation of 
virtue on the agent. Besser-Jones’ identifies three fundamental psychological needs that are 
necessary to fulfill in order for us to experience eudaimonic well-being: relatedness, autonomy, 
and competence.
8
 The most effective strategies for fulfilling these three needs provides the 
normative structure of how to best conduct our lives.  Relatedness is achieved when we feel and 
judge ourselves to have, overall, positive relations with those around us. Autonomy and 
competence involve the identification of and endorsement of personal goals and the achievement 
of said goals experienced with some level of proficiency, respectively. It is undeniable that there 
is a subjective element to the fulfillment of these goals, which naturally raises questions about 
“inauthentic” achievement. Inauthentic is the sense that, despite experiencing myself as relating 
to most or all of my peers, in reality I have failed miserably according to those same peers. Is it 
right to say I’ve fulfilled my need for relatedness if most of my peers are really just putting up a 
good front? If I join in on belittling a minority group in order to bond with certain other groups 
in power, am I simply pursuing my well-being in a different way? Besser-Jones addresses many 
such worries throughout the by citing results from various psychological studies which 
purportedly address these worries. For example, while it may not seem that I have reason to care 
                                                          
7
 Besser-Jones (2014:6). 
8
 Ibid., 49. 
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about the cold stares from groups I’ve cheerfully ostracized with my friends, there is a negative 
toll on my well-being nonetheless, which should disincentivize such behavior with respect to 
securing well-being.
910
 
Besser-Jones maintains that our own proper functioning is, by itself, a valuable goal, 
something that we ought to pursue. While the goal is more modest than the traditional 
Aristotelian conception of the “good life”, which Besser-Jones acknowledges, this particular end 
is argued to have significant value nonetheless. This is another instance of an approach to virtue 
ethics which does not hold that all moral worth is reducible to traits and virtues. Particular traits 
are better suited for flourishing than others insofar as they contribute more to the individual’s 
well-being through the satisfaction of the aforementioned psychological needs.  
As mentioned earlier though, there is undoubtedly the potential for an inaccurate, albeit 
convincing, perspective on the part of the agent with respect to whether psychological needs 
have genuinely been fulfilled. Throughout the text, Besser-Jones maintains a pluralistic outlook 
on states of character and virtue, much like Swanton, where multiple approaches to fulfilling 
psychological needs may all contribute to well-being roughly equally; there no single privileged 
set of traits or virtues everyone should pursue.
11
 One worry is that even if the more authentic 
route of relatedness may lead to greater gross fulfillment of one’s psychological needs, the effort 
expended in forming such bonds may put exceptionally high demands on time and effort. As a 
result, there may be an opportunity cost detrimental to pursuing other important needs. While 
this doesn’t threaten the internal structure of Besser-Jones’ proposal, it may lead to some 
uncomfortable recommendations for securing the best overall fulfillment of psychological needs. 
I only raise this point because Besser-Jones appears to go out of her way to establish her 
                                                          
9
 Ibid. 40. 
10
 Even non-human “peers”, like a computer program. See Besser-Jones (2014:41). 
11
 Ibid., 99. 
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approach to virtue as being compatible with traditional understandings of virtue. This is 
important, as my complaint about “uncomfortable recommendations” of virtue mirrors Snow’s 
worry about Driver’s account. Unlike Driver, Besser-Jones explicitly wishes to maintain a 
connection to traditional conceptions of virtue, so the worry here is apt. As a point in favor of 
Besser-Jones’ account, something I have argued defenders of traditional accounts of virtue ethics 
must do, is that she offers some practical commentary and advice on exactly how we could go 
about fulfilling the important psychological needs driving much of the theory, and developing 
the kinds of traits she has in mind.  
IV. The Way Forward  
Perhaps more than any other prominent moral theory, virtue ethics has come under 
intense empirical criticism. As I’ve argued throughout this dissertation, I think much of this 
criticism is well-founded, and that proponents of virtue ethics should either pursue radical new 
approaches to their theories of virtue (e.g., instrumentalist approaches), or focus efforts on 
empirically grounded developmental paths to the types of global traits so important to many of 
these theories.    
Even equipped with a developmental story for virtue, I don’t think the general situationist 
criticism of virtue ethics is the only major challenge to virtue ethical moral theories. I believe 
there’s a legitimate worry for virtue ethics in its application to many applied areas of ethics, such 
as business, biomedical, and environmental ethics. While virtue ethics can cede some ground to 
the situationist and come up with developmental stories, or affirm a purely evaluative role, such 
responses have a more difficult time gaining purchase in applied ethics. In short, the problems 
posed by situationism are more acute in applied ethics than they are in normative ethics. In the 
next and final chapter, I argue that in the case of normative business ethics, the character-based 
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tradition is especially threatened by situationist arguments. Given the failure of the virtue ethical 
model in business ethics, one can legitimately raise questions regarding the potential of virtue 
ethics in other applied realms. If a moral theory fails in multiple applied areas, I think there is 
reason to be concerned about that moral theory’s suitability as a general normative theory. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
PROBLEMS FOR CHARACTER-BASED BUSINESS ETHICS 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Many business ethicists endorse a broadly virtue ethical framework as the most 
promising normative theory of business ethics. In large part, virtue ethical approaches to 
business ethics cite the development of global character traits in employees and managers as 
ways of promoting right action (e.g., Solomon, 1999; Hartman, 2006, 2008; Melé, 2009; Provis, 
2010; Sinnicks, 2014). Call such views character-based business ethics (CBE).
1
 Many character-
based approaches to ethical thought have their roots in Aristotelian virtue ethics. Aristotle (2000: 
1105a27-b1) describes virtuous action as, in part, proceeding from “a firm and unchangeable 
character.” Some philosophers, known as situationists (e.g., Doris, 2002; Harman, 1999; Merritt 
et al., 2010), however, claim that experimental results from social psychology indicate that 
global character traits have limited behavioral influence, if any. As a result, situationists claim 
many character-based ethical theories are woefully inadequate as normative theories for human 
beings such as they are.  
Situationist arguments have been leveled against CBE (e.g., Harman, 2003), and have 
been responded to in kind (e.g., Solomon, 2003; Hartman, 2008; Alzola, 2008, 2012). 
Unfortunately, proponents of CBE have failed at times to be sensitive to the particular demands 
of business ethics while responding to situationist arguments. Defenders of CBE respond as 
                                                          
1
 Businesses ethics is, of course, sometimes focused on whether or not businesses have an obligation beyond 
increasing profits for their shareholders (e.g., Freedman, 1970; Freeman, 1984, 1994; Allhoff and Vaidya, 2005). 
For instance, considerations of worker safety may be important because of obligations to employee safety or for 
avoidance of costly litigation (Allhoff, 2011). Fortunately, for my purposes, either side of this divide is committed to 
the same kinds of vulnerabilities I have in mind for CBE. There is at least one tradition within business ethics that 
my arguments do not speak to, which is the interpretive project concerned with how actually businesses navigate 
ethically relevant situations, rather than how should businesses best navigate such situations. Here I am only 
targeting normative CBE. 
  
103 
 
though they were defending a more general virtue ethical theory rather than a normative theory 
of business ethics. While general normative theories and normative theories of business ethics 
are closely related, normative theories of business ethics have particular demands for their 
adequacy not always required of more general theories. If there were not such particular 
demands on normative business ethics, the need for rigorous and varied research into business 
ethics would be diminished. I argue that many prominent responses appropriate for defending a 
general virtue ethical theory against situationist criticism are ineffective in defending CBE. A 
well-accepted evaluative framework for normative theories of business ethics (i.e., Bishop 
(2000)) highlights the importance of normative theories of business ethics providing practical 
action guidance. The most obvious kind of action guidance that remains true to a virtue ethical 
approach to business ethics is significantly undermined by situationist arguments. Accordingly, 
CBE is in need of novel responses to situationism or radical revision. 
In Section II, I explain the evaluative framework I use to assess CBE, focusing on the 
importance of action guidance. Section III explains what is meant by a character-based approach 
to business ethics and what CBE action guidance might look like. The threat from situationism is 
explained in Section IV, and a review of some of the empirical data used by situationist to 
support their argument is detailed in Section V. In Section VI, I identify some of the more 
promising responses to situationism and argue why such responses are inappropriate for 
defending CBE. I consider some objections to my arguments in Section VII and offer a few 
replies. Finally, in Section VIII, I suggest some potential ways CBE could be revised in order to 
avoid situationist arguments. 
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II. Normative Theories of Business Ethics 
My argument that CBE is particularly vulnerable to situationist criticism stems from CBE 
being a form of normative business ethics. There are certain generally accepted requirements for 
a normative theory of business ethics that are not always applied to general normative theories. 
By general normative theories I mean familiar theories like utilitarianism or Kantian ethics that 
are often discussed in terms their overall structure and prescriptions on moral agents. As the 
great body of continuing scholarship indicates, there is much to talk about regarding general 
normative theories outside of the context of particular areas of interest, like the environment, 
medicine, and of course business. While there are clear connections between, for example, social 
contract theory (e.g., Rawls (1971)) and a social contract theory for business (e.g., Bishop 
(2000)), such theories tackle different problems. I expect none of this is particularly 
controversial, as research in applied ethics continues to thrive alongside its normative ethics 
counterpart. For my present purposes, the natural question to ask is which demands from 
normative business ethics are supposed to make CBE more vulnerable to situationist criticism. 
Defining business ethics has never been easy, as indicated by some scholars likening it to 
“nailing jello to a wall.”2 One textual analysis and survey of business ethics scholars proposed 
that the definition of business ethics that best captures the focus of the discipline is “moral rules, 
standards, codes, or principles which provide guidelines for right and truthful behavior in 
specific situations.”3 While broad, this definition clearly picks out the importance of practicality 
and action guidance. A more detailed framework has been proposed in the business ethics 
literature that has been met with general approval. Continuing off the work of Hasnas (1998), 
                                                          
2
 Lewis (1985:377). 
3
 Lewis (1985: 382), emphasis added. 
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Bishop (2000) identifies seven requirements of a business ethics theory.
4
 The business ethical 
theories success at meeting these requirements can be used to evaluate its promise as a potential 
normative theory for business. Bishop argues that a normative business ethical theory clearly 
identify the following.
5
 
(1) The recommended values of the theory 
(2) The grounds for accepting those values from (1) 
(3) A decision principle that business people who accept the theory can use 
(4) Who the normative theory applies to (i.e., which agents) 
(5) Whose interests need to be considered (i.e., the scope of the decision principle from (3)) 
(6) What contexts the normative theory applies 
(7) What legal and regulatory structures the theory assumes 
Through the specification of (1) – (7), the business ethical theory fulfills its role of identifying 
“what is ethical, not what the members of some group think is ethical.”6 Bishop’s framework 
continues to be used in assessing various approaches to business ethics (e.g., Weismann, 2009; 
Bergsteiner and Avery, 2012; Francés-Gómez et al., 2015; Santos and Laczniak, 2015). 
For the purposes of my discussion of CBE, I focus in particular on (3), the proposed 
decision principle suggested by the theory. Bishop notes that the decision principle “is vital to 
the definition of any normative theory, and, of course, vital if the theory is to be practically 
applied. A normative theory of business ethics would be useless if it did not specify how 
                                                          
4
 Bishop’s framework plays an important foundational role for my argument. For those that may be immediately 
concerned about its use here, I want to flag that I consider some potential objections to this framework’s 
applicability to character-based business ethics in Section VII(a). 
5
 Bishop (2000:564). 
6
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business people ought to act in various circumstances.”7 The decision principle should provide 
adequate action guidance. I argue that the decision principle of CBE is largely dependent on the 
development of particular character traits, whose potential development is problematic, given the 
empirical evidence. The importance of adequate decision procedurs is shared by managerial 
scholars as well, as they focus on “how ethical systems come to bear on concrete practices of 
managing and decision making.”8 In comprehensive evaluations of the effectiveness of various 
organizations’ ethical codes, the primary metrics by which these codes of ethics were evaluated 
were officially reported ethical wrongdoings and perceived ethical wrongdoings.
9
 For the 
business ethicist, how to apply the theory in practical circumstances is important, though it is 
admittedly just one of many aspects of what is to be expected from a normative business ethical 
theory.
10
 While CBE may be able to adequately address the other elementals of the framework, 
its deficiency with respect to (3) should cast serious doubt on CBE viability as a normative 
business ethics theory. 
III. Character-Based Business Ethics 
a. What is CBE? 
Proponents of CBE do not simply stress the importance of virtues in a business context. 
Traditional theories of virtue ethics are meant to apply to many aspects of one’s life, including 
work. Importantly though, there are aspects of CBE that distinguish it from merely being an 
application of a general virtue ethical theory. Such features include the purported practical 
advantage of identifying character traits versus the identification of abstract guiding principles 
for ethics education (Hartman, 2006, 2008; Melé, 2009), and strategies for developing particular 
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 Clegg et al. (2007:118). 
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 See Monast (1994) for discussions regarding the balance of purely theoretical concerns and practical applications. 
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traits and behavioral patterns in a corporation (Warren and Smith-Crowe, 2008). Other 
approaches to CBE articulate strategies for promoting virtues as a safeguard against the type of 
global economic crises experienced in 2007-2008.
11
 According to this view, a global capitalist 
system requires its actors to possess the appropriate types of virtues to ensure virtuous behavior, 
but at the same time, such a system “depletes” such virtues from individuals. The development 
of particular virtues has also been offered as a guide toward more ethical consumption of 
resources.
12
  
The general framework of CBE is said to be similar to many traditional versions of virtue 
ethics (Solomon, 1992). For instance, the virtues identified for CBE are certainly not alien to the 
broader tradition of virtue ethics. Those virtues include loyalty, dependability, and  integrity.
13
 
Integrity in particular plays a crucial role in the normative framework of CBE.
14
 An agent with 
integrity is, in part, a unified or whole individual. In a business setting, Solomon notes that, “A 
person’s integrity on the job typically requires him or her to follow the rules and practices that 
define that job, rather than allow oneself to be swayed by distractions and contrary 
temptations.”15 This is not to say that integrity disposes one to behave in accordance with 
particular rules, but rather it indicates that the person is sensitive to the particular rules and 
regulations of their business, and insofar as they are not morally problematic, respects the role of 
those rules in the business setting.  
b. The Character and Action Guidance in CBE 
In section II, I claimed that the deficiency of CBE as a theory of business ethics is due to 
its failure to fulfill the one of the important frameworks of business ethical theory identified by 
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Bishop (2000). Bishops argues that a theory of business ethics should provide action guidance 
since, “A normative theory of business ethics would be useless if it did not specify how business 
people ought to act in various circumstances.”16 As I go on to argue, the failure of CBE to 
provide adequate action guidance is not due to a structural problem with CBE. The failure is due 
instead to empirical evidence undermining the reasonableness of what I take action guidance for 
CBE to be.  
As stated earlier, one of the goals of CBE is the development of particular virtues. For 
CBE, virtues (e.g., integrity) will help the agent determine the best course of action. Importantly, 
these virtues are not behavioral dispositions to perform certain preordained ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
actions. For many virtue ethicists, including proponents of CBE, right action is realized through 
acting from a virtuous character.  Hursthouse (1999:28) defines right action for the virtue ethicist 
in the following way: “An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically 
(i.e., acting in character) do in the circumstances.”17 While at first glance this may seem 
uninformative, it indicates important commitments of virtue ethics.
18
 Acting as the virtuous agent 
would is to be sensitive to particular types of reasons in an appropriate way. That is, to possess 
virtue, and to exercise it properly. While there is variation in the virtue ethics literature, there is 
much to agree on. Annas (2005:642) notes, “Virtue is a disposition to act on reasons,” and 
Russell (2009:344) as well writes, “Acting from or exercising a virtue is one kind of acting for a 
reason.” Swanton (2001:38) describes virtue as, “a good quality or excellence of character. It is a 
disposition of acknowledging or responding to items in the field of a virtue in an excellent (or 
good enough) way.” A full conception virtue encompasses much more than sensitivity to 
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 Bishop (2000:565). 
17
 There are variations throughout the virtue ethics literature as to what constitutes right action, but connection to the 
character of the virtuous agent remains. For other account see, for example, Tiberius (2006), Russell (2009) and van 
Zyl (2011). 
18
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particular reasons for action of course, as it also includes emotional responses, motivations, and 
desires, to name only a few.
19
 All of this, of course, is perfectly compatible with a character 
based approach to business ethics. But as a theory of business ethics, it is fair to question what 
exactly action guidance could be for this character-based approach if sensitivity to reasons in a 
characteristically virtuous way is what constitutes right action. 
Given something like Hursthouse’s understanding of right action of virtue ethics, one 
might think the action guidance being to simply do as the virtuous agent would do. Hursthouse 
herself, though, resists this kind of interpretation. She argues against the codifiability of virtue 
ethics, and specifically rejects the notion of a specific action procedure being derivable from 
virtue ethics that someone could just follow.
20
 Hursthouse maintains that one needs to exercise 
virtuous faculties in order to actually do as the virtuous person would. She claims it is a mistake 
to say something like “The virtuous agent never does what is wrong” since this presupposes a 
prior identification of wrong action.
21
 Without the character or virtue of the virtuous agent, one 
cannot act as the virtuous agent would in the circumstances. The actions must stem from a settled 
state of character, not merely mimicking the action the virtuous agent would take.  
My contention that CBE fails to provide adequate action guidance, however, does not rest 
on Hursthouse’s rejection of the codifiability of virtue ethics. In principle, this is not a problem 
for CBE. At least one form of action guidance is available for CBE without undermining the 
notion of right action consistent with something like Hursthouse’s account. Generally speaking, 
action guidance could be understood as, first, making sure virtues important to CBE are 
developed in the relevant people. Action could be correctly guided by people acting from their 
virtuous character which would just be the doing as the virtuous agent would do, 
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 Nussbaum (1999:170). 
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characteristically, in the circumstances. This is admittedly a little quick, but I think it’s fair to say 
this could serve as the basis for CBE action guidance, given the importance of virtue possession 
for right action.  
It is worth noting that Bishop’s framework does allow for some alteration from the 
general normative theory to the normative business ethical theory. Bishop writes, “the decision 
principle of a normative theory of business ethics need not be the same as the fundamental moral 
principle.
22
 For example, a utilitarian maximization principle might only be applied to big picture 
company policies, rather than every single decision made on a daily basis. What this might look 
like for CBE is unclear, and would need to be developed in future research. Certainly, the actual 
institutionalization of virtue into people is cited as one of important goals of CBE.
23
 And it is 
precisely the commitment to the actual development of virtues which results in a greater 
vulnerability of CBE to situationist worries. 
A call for codifiability is not a new challenge for virtue ethics. During much of its 
contemporary development, proponents of virtue ethics have objected to the notion that a 
“proper” ethical theory has clearly defined rules.24 The objections to codifiability are interesting 
ones, but a direct objection to codifiabililty is to reject the evaluative framework of Bishop 
(2000). But the prospect of codifiability for virtue ethics is not always completely dismissed. 
Hursthouse, while maintaining that right action must come from a virtuous character, comments 
that it is not as though right action is always complete mystery to the non-virtuous. It’s 
commonly accepted that the honest person, for example, is quick to correct false impressions, 
and makes sure a potential partner in a contract is aware of and understands what they are 
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agreeing to.
25
 For a particular class of moral cases, what the virtuous person would 
characteristically do is not difficult to guess. As a result, Hursthouse claims virtue ethics has 
sufficient codification for the clear and unproblematic cases. She goes on to say, however, that 
any codification breaks down when cases get more challenging, as in how honest one should be 
in various circumstances, or exactly when it might be better to break a long held promise. In 
these hard cases, codification becomes unreasonable. In the challenging cases, one needs 
judgment and moral wisdom of the virtuous agent in order to act rightly.
26
 Challenging cases 
though are where a manager might need the most guidence. My critique of a CBE decision 
principle could be limited to the class of more challenging cases.
27
 Even granting that my 
criticism of CBE only applies when the theory is to be action guiding in very difficult 
circumstances is still a serious problem for CBE. A normative theory that has the least to say 
when it is needed the most is problematic at best.  
IV. CBE & Situationism  
Situationism does not threaten all forms of virtue ethics, and so likewise not all versions 
of CBE.
28
  The primary target of situationism has been the contemporary tradition of virtue 
ethics.
29
  Situationists argue that the virtue ethical understanding of character -- consisting in 
global traits effecting cross-situationally consistent and stable behavior -- is undermined by a 
large body of findings from social psychology. The general situationist argument against ethical 
theories committed to global traits is best understood as follows:
30
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 Though from the representative sample of studies I examine in Section V, problematic situational influence 
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(1) If systematic (e.g., scientific) observation reveals pervasive behavioral inconsistency, 
then behavior is not typically governed by global traits. 
(2) Systematic observation reveals pervasive behavioral inconsistency. 
Therefore, 
(3) Behavior is not typically governed by global traits.  
Put simply, the skeptical claim by situationists is that people don’t often behave as consistently 
as familiar theories of character would have us expect, which is supposed to imply that global 
traits are not widely instantiated in actual human populations.
31 32
  
A trait is global if it produces consistent and stable trait-appropriate behavior.
33
 
Consistency is a matter of trait-appropriate behavior reliably manifesting across a wide variety of 
trait-appropriate situations. Sara is consistently honest because she performs the relevant 
honesty-appropriate behavior in most or all aspects of her life. That is, she is honest at home, at 
work, when she is with friends, and when she is traveling, to name only a few. “Behavior” 
should be understood quiet broadly, encompassing more than just overt bodily movements, as 
“An honest person will not only be honest in her own actions, she will feel disgusted by 
dishonesty” (Annas 2011: 67-68). Stability is a matter of trait-appropriate behavior manifesting 
over time in the same way in similar trait-appropriate situations. Sara’s honesty is stable if her 
                                                          
31
 For some skeptics, this descriptive claim is paired with a normative claim to the effect that general notions of 
character and virtue predicated on global trait should be eliminated from, or minimized in, ethical thought. I do not 
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32
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honesty is an enduring feature of her over time.
34
 The conception of stability used here is 
importantly linked to consistency, as stability can also be understood as consistency over time. 
As a result, much of the debate between situationists and defenders of virtue ethics focuses on 
consistency. A seemingly lack of behavioral consistency due to certain situational factors is what 
most of the psychological literature cited by situationists is meant to show.
35
 But it is far from 
obvious how exactly consistency should be construed. Given the preceding discussion of what it 
is to be virtuous, I think it’s fair to characterize consistency in terms of reliable manifestations of 
behavior (broadly construed) with respect to the presence or absence of certain reasons for 
actions. The virtuous individual, should respond appropriately to particular reasons for actions 
across a variety of circumstances where that reason is present.
36
 Reasons need not be external 
objects in the world, but also psychological features of the agent as well. Consider Adams’ 
(2006:182) description of courage where he notes, “Courage is a matter of dealing with fears and 
dangers, not in just any way that seems good at the time … [courage] takes adequately into 
account one’s valuation of one’s most important aims.”  
Exactly which particular reasons are most important to CBE, I think, can be set aside. My 
argument doesn’t turn on reasons unique to CBE, and given the types of virtues CBE is 
concerned which, there is likely a fair amount of crossover with more general normative theories 
of virtue ethics. What is important is that the language of reason responsiveness can be found in 
the CBE literature. Part of the stated goals of CBE is to help people “act according to their 
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commitments and values despite possible short-term pressures and temptations to the contrary.”37 
The possession those traits identified by proponents of CBE are at times said to be even more 
important for managers, given their greater responsibilities. Some argue that the “selection of 
virtuous individuals is certainly to be encouraged the more power a role carries.”38  
To sum up, the types of traits proponents of CBE are interested in cultivating are those 
which dispose the possessors to be responsive to particular reasons for action across a wide 
variety of circumstances. The cultivation of such traits is intended to be the foundation on which 
good corporate and social policy is to be built.
39
 Part of being responsive to the right kinds of 
reasons is to not be swayed by problematic factors (e.g., morally irrelevant factors or 
temptations). Such problematic factors should not regularly enhance nor inhibit those behaviors 
associated with the traits. The actual cultivation of these virtues, I’ve argued, is the most obvious 
way for CBE to address the need for some kind of action guidance that so important to the 
framework of normative theories of business ethics. 
V. Situationist Evidence  
The second premise of the general situationist argument from Section III states, 
“Systematic observation reveals pervasive behavioral inconsistency.” As I mentioned earlier, my 
reading of ‘behavioral’ in the context of this debate is rather broad, and is not merely overt 
bodily movements. Cognitions and emotions have a role to play as well. The above premise is an 
empirical claim, and thus needs empirical evidence. The full collection of the empirical evidence 
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cited by situationists is much too large for a single paper, so I focus here only a representative 
sample of the relevant studies.
40
 
Stanley Milgram’s obedience study is one of the most cited studies in debates between 
situationists and defenders of virtue ethics.
 41
 The published conclusions reveal that everyday 
people can be driven to administer seemingly dangerous electric shocks to an innocent person 
under the gentle urgings of a stern scientist. While some test subjects were described as tense or 
nervous, they continued to obey. Subjects heard clear protests and screams of the confederate as 
they administered (or so they thought) increasingly dangerous electric shocks. Some, including 
Solomon (2002), have interpreted the findings as being indicative of a not-so-surprising general 
obedience to authority. Additional variations of the experiment, however, cast significant doubt 
on this interpretation. While the physical presence of the scientist next to the subjects resulted in 
high levels of obedience, put that scientists on the phone, and obedience plummets.
42
 This calls 
into question what exactly people are being responsive to, whether they are going along with the 
experiment or ceasing participation.   
In a less dramatic study, researchers found an association between light levels and 
cheating behavior.
43
 Subjects in the study completed a series of anagrams and were allowed to 
score their own work. Each correct answer earned the subject a cash reward. Inaccurate scoring 
in favor of earning more money was significantly higher in the room with lower light levels. 
Cheating also similarly increased for subjects wearing sunglasses.  
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Numerous studies have investigated the relation between helping behavior and the 
number of potential helpers present. In one study, subjects were seated in a room and heard a 
loud crash and a cry of pain from a neighboring room. Subjects who were alone when they heard 
the crash were much more likely to get up and investigate than those who were in the room with 
others. The same kinds of effects have been readily documented in large crowds outside of the 
laboratory as well, sometimes dubbed the “group effect”. There are multiple theories as to why 
this occurs, from the idea that large crowds diffuse responsibility, or even the desire to avoid 
embarrassment of being the only person to offer assistance when none might be needed.
44
 What 
seems to be implied by these cases is that most people are not responsive to what we would 
expect to be sufficient reason to offer minimal assistance. 
From this sampling of studies, the threat of situationism becomes, hopefully, clearer. 
What is important is not so much the bad behavior on the part of the participants, but rather how 
minor situational factors can seemingly push people’s behavior around so readily.45 For many 
people, whether or not the lights were dimmed a bit significantly impacted their propensity to 
cheat. Along the same lines, orders to inflict suffering on another human being were followed or 
not based on those orders coming from someone standing next to them, or over the phone. That 
people are pushed around so easily by such factors, and so failing to be responsive to clear 
reasons for action is how I think the situationist best makes their argument.  
VI. Responses to Situationism 
The general situationist argument I presented is found throughout the relevant literature. 
Not surprisingly, a great variety of responses have been voiced in defense of virtue ethics. In this 
section, I consider some of the more prominent responses. I believe these responses in defense of 
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virtue ethics are worth taking seriously, and are deserving of the continuing attention they 
receive. As I go on to argue in this section though, the use of such responses in the normative 
business ethics literature is misguided. Given the general evaluative framework of a normative 
business ethical theory discussed in Section II, in particular the need for action guidance, the 
most promising responses to situationism fail to defend CBE. 
Within the virtue ethics situationist debate, there is a helpful taxonomy of the various 
responses offered by defenders of virtue ethics, which includes the Rarity Response and counter-
attack.
46
 
a. Rarity Response 
To use the co-called Rarity Response is to claim virtue is a rare ideal, so the fact that 
behavior consistent with global traits (virtuous or otherwise) is rarely (if at all) observed in social 
psychology experiments should come as no surprise.
47
 Furthermore, attaining the virtues is a life-
long pursuit, requiring great effort and dedication. To take this kind of line is to interpret talk of 
virtue as a primarily normative discourse; lack of empirical corroboration is largely irrelevant to 
the theory. Under this interpretation, the discourse of global traits could be thought of as an 
evaluative discourse, and it can fulfill this role whether or not the psychological structures it 
presupposes are instantiated in actual human beings. The extent to which this is a perspicuous 
understanding of important strains in philosophical (and every day) thinking on character, or an 
independently appealing approach to philosophical ethics, is debatable; certainly, “psychological 
realism” is often treated as a desideratum for ethical theories in general,48 and virtue ethical 
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theories in particular,
49
 and it is quite unclear that this is an advantage purely evaluative theories 
can claim.  
While this defense is by no means conclusive, it is certainly available to defenders of 
virtue ethics to deflect some situationist worries.
50
 Some proponents of CBE have made 
arguments in line with the Rarity Response. Solomon notes that experimental results merely 
remind us of “something we’d rather not remember, that ordinary people sometimes act very 
badly in group and institutional situations. This should come as no surprise to those of us who do 
corporate or organizational ethics.”51 Alzola makes a similar remark, claiming “If virtue requires 
practical wisdom, one would expect virtuous persons to be rare. Full possession of a virtue is 
atypical.”52 
There is good reason to think, however, that the Rarity Response is not a viable option for 
proponents of CBE. Recall from Section II, I suggest action guidance for CBE involves the 
actual development of the relevant virtues. Newton (1992:363), in line with my suggestion, 
describes one of the first goals of business ethics to be putting “good (virtuous) people in 
positions of responsibility.” If a proponent of CBE readily takes the rarity response, they are 
admitting to potential action guidance as something rare, fully available to potentially only a 
select few. This strikes me as an odd recommendation for a business to implement. Granted, the 
Rarity Response may not necessarily mean the near impossibility of attaining virtue. Instead, the 
attainment of virtue may be a live possibility, but only after a lifetime of dedication and study. I 
have similar worries here. Presumably, businesses and managers are concerned with employee 
behavior in a much shorter time-frame, and so timeline for the practical action guidance should 
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not be something that takes employee their whole lifetime. While it is certainly not objectionable 
for an employee to have the noble goal of pursuing a virtuous state of character, a failure of a 
right action will likely not be excused on the basis of employees only just beginning their path to 
virtue. People in positions of authority aren’t supposed to be works in progress.53  
To attempt to reconcile situationist evidence with CBE based on the rarity of virtue is to 
accept an inadequate normative business ethical theory, given the difficulties with realizing a 
practical action guidance. CBE, as it is often articulated, is meant to be a business-wide 
recommendation, and not only geared toward a select few. As one proponent of CBE notes, 
“virtue itself needs to be institutionalized; we need an appropriate governance of virtue in 
organization.”54 If virtue is accepted as a rare ideal, it is difficult to see how action guidance 
would be practically implemented. 
b. Counter-attack  
The counter-attack is a response to the effect that the types of studies used by 
situationists against virtue ethics are insufficient to show a lack of virtue. There are at least two 
ways of understanding this response. One way is to simply reject that the situationist 
interpretation of the experimental data. To put is concisely, the claim is that data simply doesn’t 
undermine the idea that most people possess some kind of global trait.
55
 The other version of this 
response is to claim that situationists have the wrong conception of virtue.   
a. Improper Interpretation of Experimental Data 
Alzola (2012:394) argues that objective behavioral measurements are plainly deficient for 
establishing whether or not human beings have the kinds of mental states needed for virtue. 
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Alzola interprets situationists as claiming that overt behavioral acts are necessary and sufficient 
for trait ascription.
56
 He goes on to argue that this is the wrong conception of virtue since, 
according to Aristotle, acting in a less-than-perfectly virtuous manner is at times is compatible 
with virtue possession. Solomon (2003:53) complains results from studies like the Milgram 
experiment should be discounted because of the unusual and contrived nature of the situation. 
The studies, he argues, aren’t testing the right aspects of character, since such situations are so 
unfamiliar to the agent. If the above criticisms are correct, then evidence offered by the 
situationist, whether applied to CBE or virtue ethics in general, fails to hit the intended target.  
First, I worry about the conception of situationism offered by Alzola (2012). The claim 
that the situationist understands behavior as both necessary and sufficient for virtue seems 
inaccurate. Doris (2002:17) describes overt behavior as important for virtue, though readily 
acknowledging “Virtues are not mere dispositions but intelligent dispositions, characterized by 
distinctive patterns of emotional response, deliberation, and decision as well as by more overt 
behavior.” Additionally, I don’t think situationist argument is an inductive argument starting 
with various individuals failing to possess the right kinds of traits. Indeed, situationists readily 
admit that direct evidence for or against a particular person’s possession of one kind of character 
trait or another would require long term, systematic observation of that individual.
57
 Instead, in 
interpreting experimental results to support their argument, situationists are best understood as 
appealing to inference to the best explanation. That the presence or absence of morally irrelevant 
situational factors appears to push around people’s morally relevant behavior is what the 
situationist highlights. I agree with Alzola and others that the Milgram experiment does not show 
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us that most of the subjects were non-virtuous people.
58
 There doesn’t need to be any particular 
character judgement about any particular person in the experiment for situationist worries to 
surface. What we can infer from the results is that people’s morally relevant behavior is pushed 
around by problematic factors. Specifically, most people fail to be consistency responsive to 
particular reasons for action. Action guidance for CBE would then be highly susceptible to 
problematic interference. Since action guidance for a normative theory of business ethics is 
meant for practical implementation, information about situational factors that could easily derail 
right action seem quite relevant.  
b. Wrong Conception of Virtue 
Based on much of the evidence cited, situationists hold overt behavior as crucially 
important for the evaluation of right action. Some people defend virtue ethics by deemphasizing 
overt behavior. For example, virtue relevant behavior has been argued to be introspective 
evaluation of one’s own motivations and concerns (Annas, 2003) or the right kind of emotional 
response (Swanton, 2003). The types of performances related to these conceptions of virtue are 
not the typical target for study in studies cited by situationists.  For example, the fact that many 
subjects in the original Milgram experiment expressed great anxiety and distress while they 
continued to “shock” the victim is the right kind of emotional response, and thus might be taken 
as evidence of a developing virtue (Swanton, 2003). Like the Rarity Response, these are not 
conclusive replies, but they’re available for defenders of virtues ethics for responding to 
situationists. But like the rarity response, this response is a poor fit for defenders of CBE. 
On its face, this kind of response is problematic for a view concerned with action 
guidance. CBE is intended to guide people towards right action (i.e., what the virtuous person 
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would characteristically do in the circumstances). And as a normative theory of business ethics, 
it should provide action guidance that can be applied in various situations. If a proponent of CBE 
wishes to downplay overt behavioral acts, it’s difficult to see what people are being guided 
towards. For example, merely having certain emotional responses, virtuous though they may be, 
is insufficient for effective action guidance in a business. One of the expectations of the decision 
principle is a certain amount of practicality.  Recall the description from Bishop (2000) of a 
normative theory needing to give real direction on what to do.
59
 If the action is limited to not 
include overt behavioral act, this cast serious doubts on its usefulness. While a normative 
business ethical theory is by no means exhausted by its practical applications, such applications 
are an important part of the normative business ethics framework.
60
 After all, good companies 
aren’t built on good intentions. Certainly, the importance of overt behavior is stressed by 
proponents of more general theories of virtue ethics. Consider Adams (2006:137): “If [virtues] 
are to have the excellence that qualifies them as virtues, they should not be impotent in the 
shaping of behavior … [virtues] should normally involve behavioral dispositions of some sort.” 
Again, overt behavior does not exhaust virtue, but it is an important component, especially for 
the role it would play in action guidance. Alzola himself notes “Normative business ethics is 
roughly concerned with theories of how business persons ought to behave and how organizations 
ought to be governed.”61 
To be clear, I think de-emphasizing overt behavior can still have purchase for the defense 
of more general virtue ethical theories (pace Adams). One recent suggestion by Murray (2014) is 
that if a given theory isolates the primary constituents of character from those processes shown 
to be sensitive to situational influence in problematic ways, then situationist arguments lose 
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 Bishop (2000:565). 
60
 Ibid.,566-569 
61
 Alzola (2010:2), original emphasis. 
  
123 
 
much of their force.62 But for the reasons stated above, rejecting studies that only measure overt 
behavior is a problematic defense of CBE.  
VII. Potential Defenses of CBE 
One may largely agree with what I’ve had to say so far, yet claim that my strategy cuts 
both ways. While traditional defenses of virtue ethics may not work for CBE, perhaps the 
framework of normative business ethics results in situationist argument being deflected in other 
ways. In this section, I consider some potential defenses of CBE in light of my criticism, and 
some replies to those defenses. 
a. The Normative Framework of Business Ethics 
Much of my argument depends on the requirement, following Bishop (2000), that a 
normative theory of business ethics provide action guidance that could be practically 
implemented in a business. I’ve assumed action guidance for CBE is structured around the actual 
instantiation of the relevant virtues in people within the business, which in turn makes the 
problems posed by situationism more acute for CBE. There are at least two ways to respond to 
point this. The first is to simply reject Bishop’s framework. Second, that requiring specific action 
guidance, or some manner of codifiability, is an improper requirement for a normative theory in 
the virtue ethics tradition.
63
 
Rejection of Bishop’s framework would undoubtedly undercut my argument, but such a 
rejection puts one at odds with others in the business ethics tradition who continue to use this 
framework as well. Weismann (2009) cites the elements of the framework in their argument for 
the failure of the self-regulatory model of corporate behavior. Bishop’s argument for stakeholder 
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 Along similar lines, one could object to the definition of business ethics provided by Lewis (1985) mentioned in 
Section II. 
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theory, which was first advanced using his framework, continues to be cited in the relevant 
literature.
64
 Similarly, Bergsteiner and Avery (2012:400), in their critique of shareholder theory, 
cite Bishop’s arguments against that theory as well. Not surprisingly, Bishop’s arguments against 
shareholder theory depend on his own framework of evaluation. Many other strands of business 
ethics continue to depend on Bishop’s framework.65 Whatever one may think of stakeholder 
theory, shareholder theory, and the various other areas where Bishop’s framework has been 
applied, my point here is that Bishop’s framework has a solid place within the field of normative 
business ethics. This does not mean, of course, that one must accept Bishop (2000) without 
complaint. I do, however, think the burden of proof is on those that wish to reject an established 
way of evaluating normative theories of business ethics if they wish to drop the framework in the 
case of CBE.  
As I mentioned earlier though, one may think that Bishop’s framework is an unsuitable 
evaluative tool for CBE, though still maintain its general applicability in other aspects of 
business ethics. Indeed, proponents of virtue ethics have at times resisted codifiability in 
general.
66
 Even if it is not a wholesale rejection of Bishop’s framework, I still think someone that 
would object along these lines owes an account of why CBE is the exception to an established 
evaluative framework for the very type of theory CBE is purported to be. Besides this, someone 
taking this kind of line would need to explain how it is a normative theory of business ethics is 
not to be held accountable for providing actual, practical guidance for people in the business 
world. I do not mean to make the much stronger claim made by some that normative business 
ethics should not deal in the abstract theory or difficult concepts that might not always have a 
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clear, practical offshoot. But at some point, and there seems to be a fair amount of agreement in 
the literature on this, a theory needs to offer practical solutions for the real world.
67
   
b. Teaching virtue 
Some have argued that, rather than being a problem for CBE, studies cited by 
situationists can actually be used to help develop people’s character. For example, studying the 
results of the Milgram experiment can help employees avoid Milgram-like business scenarios, 
viz., developing techniques to resist performing unethical actions despite the prompting of an 
authority figure. (Hartman, 2008). The suggestion of habituating oneself to virtuous 
responsiveness goes all the way back to Aristotle.  
There are, however, I think some problems with this kind of response. The first is that, at 
best, such a strategy could only be effective for known situational factors.
68
 If there is one lesson 
from the debate between situationists and defenders of virtue ethics, it’s that people’s behavior is 
significantly affected by surprising situational features.
69
 Employees and managers will not be 
inoculated against those factors that the training doesn’t prepare them for (e.g., knowing about 
Milgram-like situations, but being ignorant of the impact of lower light levels on cheating 
behavior in various situations). Training to be mindful of potentially problematic situational 
factors is even more difficult in cases where those situational factors are very subtle or below the 
level of conscious awareness. Research in automaticity is the result of several processes we are 
unaware of that function below the level of conscious awareness. 
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 For further discussion on these points, see Andrew Stark’s (1993) initial critic of business ethics as much too 
abstract to be useful, and the many responses to it, such as Monast (1994) and Hasnas (1998). These responses 
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One of many interesting results from automaticity research is that the location where one 
votes impacts the types of social policies one casts a vote for. Voting in a school, as opposed to a 
neutral location like a post office or town hall building, increases the likelihood that people 
support a sales tax increase for education funding.
70
 Several subsequent reviews of automaticity 
studies have supported other so-called priming effects, like racial stereotype priming being 
linked to increased aggression.
71
 This is only a sampling of the priming studies that are 
potentially relevant to debates about character and virtue. If the impact of such factors routinely 
occur below the level of conscious awareness, self-monitoring would be very difficult,  
 The second major problem with this type of ethics training is its relation to the 
development of virtue. If employees’ virtuous behavior depends on recall of experimental 
results, it is not obvious that this is evidence of trait development in that employee. Avoiding a 
situation because of fear of situational influence seems to be a long way from responsive to the 
right kinds of reasons. It could be argued that recall of the relevant experiment results is an aid 
for identifying what are and what are not the relevant factors and considerations for a situation. 
But needing an extra aid or avoiding a specific situation because of morally hazardous situational 
influences is to acknowledge being unable to respond the right kinds of reasons required for 
virtuous behavior.
72
 This not to downplay the strategy in principle of course, viz., it is certainly 
rational to avoid those situations known to not be conducive to making good decisions.  The 
point is though that in these cases I am acknowledging my inability to respond properly to 
situational factors. Solomon notes that one of the main goals and advantages of CBE is 
cultivating character as a “personal bulwark (call it ‘integrity’) against … pressures and 
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rationalizations.”73 Simple recall of potentially problematic factors is hardly much of a personal 
bulwark.  
Even if there is some promise to ethics education that encourages avoiding situations that 
lead to morally problematic behavior, which situationists at times suggest (e.g, Merritt, 2000; 
Doris, 2002:147), such a strategy would likely not always be an option for large number of 
employees. There is a general problem, identified by Alfano (2013) that many of the situational 
factors to be avoided are factors one has little control over, like smells and noises. To make 
matters worse for proponents of CBE, employees often have limited control over their immediate 
situations. This is especially true in the cases of subordinates following their superior’s 
instructions. Because of this, not only is CBE threatened by situationist arguments, but it may 
indicate a need for expanded managerial responsibility. Since managers are often responsible for 
the situations employees find themselves in, managers may need to be held more accountable for 
employee’s bad acts that were heavily influenced by certain situational factors. 
c. Narrow Virtues for Narrow Situations 
Early in the debate between situationists and defenders of virtue ethics, Doris (2002) 
offered an alternative conception of traits to replace the traditional global traits he argues against. 
This has come to be known as a narrow or local trait view.
74
 So while traits such as courage or 
honesty, or really any kind of global trait, are not widely instantiated in the population, 
something like courage-in-the-workplace or honesty-at-parties might be more empirically 
viable. For a general theory of virtue ethics, such narrow traits are a departure from traditional 
conceptions of global traits. For business ethics, however, perhaps this option is more viable. 
Although I imagine most businesses would prefer their employees perform right actions even 
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when they’re off the clock, the framework I’ve been evaluating CBE by has no such 
requirement. So the response might go, by their own arguments, situationists offer CBE a 
defense against just the kind of criticism that I am raising. Namely that CBE need focus only on 
the development of the types of narrow traits argued for by situationists in the first place, like 
honesty-in-the-workplace and integrity-in-the-workplace. Indeed, perhaps CBE requires a much 
weaker form of consistency, since the pool of situations is limited to work-relevant ones.
75
 
There are a few things to be said in reply here. First, my endorsement of the situationist 
argument against global traits in the context of business ethics does not commit me to any 
positive conceptions of traits offered by situationists. And while it might initially seem promising 
to focus on a more narrow set of situation-specific traits, the growing body of psychological 
evidence undermines even these more empirically modest local traits. The factors that 
significantly push around people’s behavior are not always general environmental contexts, such 
as an office, public mall, or classroom. Instead, time and time again, factors like guilt, 
embarrassment, anger, fear of blame, and the presence or absence of other people lead to 
surprising behaviors.
76
 If these factors are what significantly, and often problematically, push 
around our behavior, there just isn’t a general environmental context, like workplace, that will 
secure some limited form of consistency.
 77
 It’s hard to believe the factors mentioned above 
would be much more consistent in a workplace than they would be otherwise. The lack of 
consistency that perhaps first inspired the narrow trait view in the first place may go much 
deeper than first imagined. Even when restricted to business hours, the prospects for consistency 
appear no less grim. The evidence used by situationists appears to undermine the narrow traits 
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that were offered as a replacement for global traits. Accordingly, a move to narrow traits for 
action guidance is hardly a viable alternative for CBE. 
VIII. Concluding Thoughts  
The debate between defenders of virtue ethics and situationists is far from settled, as 
philosophers on both sides of the debate continue to develop new arguments. However, it 
appears that CBE is particularly susceptible to situationist worries. And unfortunately for those 
that argue for CBE, many of the more recent replies to situationism by defenders of virtue ethics 
are not as appropriate for a normative theory of business ethics. Because of this, developing a 
viable version of CBE has some additional challenges. Proponents of CBE need to provide novel 
responses to situationist challenges appropriate to a business ethics context. I’ve mentioned a few 
ways in which CBE might better meet the situationist challenge. In particular, if the general 
normative framework for a theory of business ethics is to remain intact, development of more 
concrete action guidance is needed. The actual instantiation of a particular kind of character, 
consisting in global traits, may need to be abandoned.  
I hardly wish to characterize a character-based approach to normative business ethics as a 
lost cause. There are innovative approaches to virtue ethics that fair far better in the face of 
situationist arguments. So-called instrumentalist approaches to virtue, while still maintaining the 
importance of a realistic moral psychology, are not committed to the global trait view so 
common in the virtue ethics literature. For instrumentalist views, there is no intrinsic value to 
any particular state of character. A state of character is valuable insofar as it is instrumentally 
valuable in bringing about particular states of affairs. Some instrumentalist views focus on traits 
which produce the best consequences, while others focus on the psychological well-being of the 
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agent themselves.
78
 There’s no reason to think an instrumentalist approach to virtue couldn’t 
work as the foundation for a normative theory of business ethics. Conceptions of virtue in 
instrumentalist theories are not as susceptible to situationist worries, and thus action guidance 
built around instrumental states of character does not necessarily face the problems I’ve 
discussed here. Given the importance of a clear and applicable action guidance to a normative 
theory of business ethics, I believe it crucial that proponents of CBE to revise their respective 
theories, lest they remain highly susceptible to situationist arguments.  
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